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annietaber's review against another edition
fast-paced
3.0
Kinda flop. Maybe it’s just cuz I’ve read so much abt this recently, but like YEAH of course Brexit is about divisions between old conservatives and young liberals…. Banging title tho
jameshafoster's review against another edition
3.0
The transformational processes of university expansion and rising ethnic diversity driven by mass immigration have produced a steady accumulation of demographic pressure in the electoral system, as the composition of the electorate has changed and new fault lines have emerged.
These demographic changes opened up new divides between ‘identity conservatives’ – white school leavers with an ethnocentric ‘us against them’ worldview – and ‘identity liberals’ – university graduates and ethnic minorities for whom anti-racism is a central social and political value.
The first wave of mass immigration in the 1960s began the process of ethnic change and triggered the first mass political mobilisation of these identity conflicts. Then, decades later, a second wave of immigration interacted with a political system where old loyalties were decaying, mobilising identity conflicts which have been working their way through the political system ever since.
There was growing evidence in the 2000s and early 2010s that the great tectonic plates of traditional party politics were beginning to shudder and creak under the accumulated pressures: New Labour’s persistent troubles with immigration; the backfiring Conservative pledge on migration control; the emergence of UKIP, all were symptoms of a system under strain.
The 2016 EU Referendum triggered the earthquake that released decades of built-up pressure, mobilising the identity divides which had been building for many years and forging them into new Leave and Remain political identities.
While the ethnocentric impulse to see politics as an ‘us against them’ battle is fundamental, the nature of the identity conflicts which activate such impulses depends on the political context. In England and Wales, ethnocentric voters have come to see first immigrants, and then the EU, as the primary threat, the ‘them’ that ‘we’ must control.
In Scotland, the same voters see England and Westminster as ‘them’, and often see immigrants and the EU as allies against this primary threat. Identity liberals are also sensitive to political context. Such voters regarded the immigration-focused mobilisation of ethnocentric sentiments in England and Wales as a violation of anti-racism social norms, and therefore strongly rejected both UKIP and the Leave campaign as agents of intolerance.
In Scotland, by contrast, though the SNP and Yes campaigns mobilised ethnocentric sentiments against England and Westminster, they also framed their political goal of independence in terms of progressive values, enabling a campaign which at root involved an ‘us against them’ battle palatable to voters on the liberal side of the identity politics divide.
The forces unleashed by the referendums have reshaped British political competition, changing both main parties. The David Cameron-led Conservative Party that called the referendum in 2016 was one where (grudging) acceptance of EU membership as being in Britain’s national interest was the norm.
The Boris Johnson-led Conservative Party, which won a massive election mandate three years later, is one where British EU membership is anathema, and even close post-Brexit alignment with the EU is regarded with suspicion.
The Labour Party of 2016 was one that sought to balance the interests of the large cohort of Labour MPs from the most strongly Remain constituencies with those of an equally large cohort of Labour MPs from the most strongly Leave seats. The Labour Party of 2020 is now dominated by MPs from identity liberal Remain-voting areas, but also reeling from a wave of historic defeats in longstanding, but Leave-voting, strongholds.
While both traditional governing parties have been shaken internally by the mobilisation of new identity politics conflicts, other parties have sought at various points to capitalise on the new divisions. UKIP and its rebranded successor the Brexit Party both caused turmoil by mobilising ethnocentric voters with an extreme ‘us against them’ message focused on assertive nationalism and opposition to the threats from Europe and immigration. The Liberal Democrats and the Green Party experienced polling surges by seeking to mobilise cosmopolitan, Europhile and anti-racist voters on the identity liberal end of the spectrum.
Thus far, new parties have failed to break the traditional two-party duopoly, but the summer 2019 polling surges for the Liberal Democrats and the Brexit Party highlight the fragility of the old order in a political context where new identity conflicts continue to reshape loyalties.
The changes in Scottish politics since 2014 highlight how a polarising identity conflict – over Scottish independence in this instance – can upend the political order and replace it with an entirely new pattern of party competition.
The demographic changes producing this new instability are unstoppable. This process has not ended with Brexit, indeed it is likely to accelerate in decades to come as the cohorts who came of age before the advent of mass higher education and mass immigration fade away and are replaced by the most highly educated and ethnically diverse generations Britain has ever seen. Every year Britain’s politicians will face an electorate that is a little more diverse and a little more university educated. Every year the ethnocentric electorate of white school leavers will get a little smaller.
Such electoral climate change is unstoppable, creating unavoidable dilemmas for political parties, but as we have argued throughout this book, the parties are not spectators in this process – the choices they make in responding to these changes inform the way voters understand the conflicts they generate, framing how new and old divides are packaged together, and structuring the choices available to voters.
America’s recent political experience suggests that identity liberals, too, can mobilise politically in response to the emergence of a salient threat – in this case the threat identity liberals perceive from President Trump and his supporters. A similar ‘awokening’ process could occur in Britain if younger white graduates react to Brexit-related disruptions, or the emergence of new English nationalist or anti-Muslim political movements, by coming to see white identity conservatives as a threatening out-group, and intensifying their commitment to anti-prejudice norms and the defence of minorities in response to this threat.
We have shown that the mobilisation of ethnocentrism is a powerful political weapon. Yet the political power of identity conservatives also reflected the weakness of their antagonists, who did not mobilise to the same extent in the years prior to the EU Referendum. Now that Brexit has given identity liberal voters a common political identity, a set of power grievances regarding the political status quo, and a belief that political opponents pose a threat to their core values, politicians on the liberal left may have an opportunity to mobilise their side of the identity politics divide more effectively. The past decade has belonged to those who activated and mobilised identity conservatives. The next decades may belong to those who learn to do the same with identity liberals.
These demographic changes opened up new divides between ‘identity conservatives’ – white school leavers with an ethnocentric ‘us against them’ worldview – and ‘identity liberals’ – university graduates and ethnic minorities for whom anti-racism is a central social and political value.
The first wave of mass immigration in the 1960s began the process of ethnic change and triggered the first mass political mobilisation of these identity conflicts. Then, decades later, a second wave of immigration interacted with a political system where old loyalties were decaying, mobilising identity conflicts which have been working their way through the political system ever since.
There was growing evidence in the 2000s and early 2010s that the great tectonic plates of traditional party politics were beginning to shudder and creak under the accumulated pressures: New Labour’s persistent troubles with immigration; the backfiring Conservative pledge on migration control; the emergence of UKIP, all were symptoms of a system under strain.
The 2016 EU Referendum triggered the earthquake that released decades of built-up pressure, mobilising the identity divides which had been building for many years and forging them into new Leave and Remain political identities.
While the ethnocentric impulse to see politics as an ‘us against them’ battle is fundamental, the nature of the identity conflicts which activate such impulses depends on the political context. In England and Wales, ethnocentric voters have come to see first immigrants, and then the EU, as the primary threat, the ‘them’ that ‘we’ must control.
In Scotland, the same voters see England and Westminster as ‘them’, and often see immigrants and the EU as allies against this primary threat. Identity liberals are also sensitive to political context. Such voters regarded the immigration-focused mobilisation of ethnocentric sentiments in England and Wales as a violation of anti-racism social norms, and therefore strongly rejected both UKIP and the Leave campaign as agents of intolerance.
In Scotland, by contrast, though the SNP and Yes campaigns mobilised ethnocentric sentiments against England and Westminster, they also framed their political goal of independence in terms of progressive values, enabling a campaign which at root involved an ‘us against them’ battle palatable to voters on the liberal side of the identity politics divide.
The forces unleashed by the referendums have reshaped British political competition, changing both main parties. The David Cameron-led Conservative Party that called the referendum in 2016 was one where (grudging) acceptance of EU membership as being in Britain’s national interest was the norm.
The Boris Johnson-led Conservative Party, which won a massive election mandate three years later, is one where British EU membership is anathema, and even close post-Brexit alignment with the EU is regarded with suspicion.
The Labour Party of 2016 was one that sought to balance the interests of the large cohort of Labour MPs from the most strongly Remain constituencies with those of an equally large cohort of Labour MPs from the most strongly Leave seats. The Labour Party of 2020 is now dominated by MPs from identity liberal Remain-voting areas, but also reeling from a wave of historic defeats in longstanding, but Leave-voting, strongholds.
While both traditional governing parties have been shaken internally by the mobilisation of new identity politics conflicts, other parties have sought at various points to capitalise on the new divisions. UKIP and its rebranded successor the Brexit Party both caused turmoil by mobilising ethnocentric voters with an extreme ‘us against them’ message focused on assertive nationalism and opposition to the threats from Europe and immigration. The Liberal Democrats and the Green Party experienced polling surges by seeking to mobilise cosmopolitan, Europhile and anti-racist voters on the identity liberal end of the spectrum.
Thus far, new parties have failed to break the traditional two-party duopoly, but the summer 2019 polling surges for the Liberal Democrats and the Brexit Party highlight the fragility of the old order in a political context where new identity conflicts continue to reshape loyalties.
The changes in Scottish politics since 2014 highlight how a polarising identity conflict – over Scottish independence in this instance – can upend the political order and replace it with an entirely new pattern of party competition.
The demographic changes producing this new instability are unstoppable. This process has not ended with Brexit, indeed it is likely to accelerate in decades to come as the cohorts who came of age before the advent of mass higher education and mass immigration fade away and are replaced by the most highly educated and ethnically diverse generations Britain has ever seen. Every year Britain’s politicians will face an electorate that is a little more diverse and a little more university educated. Every year the ethnocentric electorate of white school leavers will get a little smaller.
Such electoral climate change is unstoppable, creating unavoidable dilemmas for political parties, but as we have argued throughout this book, the parties are not spectators in this process – the choices they make in responding to these changes inform the way voters understand the conflicts they generate, framing how new and old divides are packaged together, and structuring the choices available to voters.
America’s recent political experience suggests that identity liberals, too, can mobilise politically in response to the emergence of a salient threat – in this case the threat identity liberals perceive from President Trump and his supporters. A similar ‘awokening’ process could occur in Britain if younger white graduates react to Brexit-related disruptions, or the emergence of new English nationalist or anti-Muslim political movements, by coming to see white identity conservatives as a threatening out-group, and intensifying their commitment to anti-prejudice norms and the defence of minorities in response to this threat.
We have shown that the mobilisation of ethnocentrism is a powerful political weapon. Yet the political power of identity conservatives also reflected the weakness of their antagonists, who did not mobilise to the same extent in the years prior to the EU Referendum. Now that Brexit has given identity liberal voters a common political identity, a set of power grievances regarding the political status quo, and a belief that political opponents pose a threat to their core values, politicians on the liberal left may have an opportunity to mobilise their side of the identity politics divide more effectively. The past decade has belonged to those who activated and mobilised identity conservatives. The next decades may belong to those who learn to do the same with identity liberals.
thethom's review against another edition
4.0
Brexit and the rise of populist parties has produced no shortage of books purporting to explain the EU referendum and the current state of British politics. Brexitland is the best Brexit inspired book yet. Unlike previous books like National Populism: The revolt against Liberal Democracy, Brexitland avoids blatant straw man arguments and mostly avoids the crude caricatures, irrelevant comparisons and strange arguments that permeate that Brexit inspired book.
One particularly strong feature of Brexitland is the discussion of historical reactions to ethnic diversity produced by immigration after the Second World War as many subjects of the British Empire came to Britain resulting in an extremely strong backlash against rising ethnic diversity. They show how popular Enoch Powell's views were among the public and discuss how Edward Heath's humanitarian decision to allow Ugandan refugees to settle in Britain cost him dearly.
They also highlight the importance of policy options to alleviate the backlash against immigration. Thatcher successfully used strict immigration policy to win over these ethnocentric identity conservative voters to her leadership. Something Blair, Brown and Cameron were unable to do as a result of EU membership.
There are however a few shortcomings of Sobolewska and Ford's explanation of identity politics driving British political behaviour. First, they repeatedly note the importance of educational expansion in creating the identity liberal group but they never explain why university expansion creates this alternative form of identity politics. Why is it that citizens who go to university are socially liberal? This is a consistent trend seen across countries. Is it simply socialisation whereby young liberals meet other young liberals from different backgrounds thus solidifying liberal beliefs on average? Or could it be something else. They do not say.
Ethnocentrism could have been discussed with a clearer delineation from related concepts like nativism, xenophobia and authoritarianism. They reference the important work of Karen Stenner in explaining the activation of ethnocentrism in British politics, but they seem unsure of whether ethnocentrism is a product of authoritarianism or something else. More discussion of this link and extra clarity when discussing their concepts would have been helpful.
The final issue I would have liked to see discussed is what constitutes racism and why the boundaries of racism shift. They avoid actually defining and discussing what constitutes racism in their view despite the abundance of available literature. They say that as anti-racism norms move quickly this leaves behind the identity conservatives who legitimately believe that racism is constantly shifting to encompass their legitimate resentments. What this misses is that racism is not a static phenomenon and that political actors can still use racism to their political advantage. Once it became politically unacceptable to discuss the racial inferiority of Black Americans, new coded racist dog whistles were used by the Nixon campaign to appeal to racist voters. This is one obvious reason why norms around racism will shift over time.
Brexitland is an interesting political science book which analyses the role of identity politics in British political history and compares the configuration of identity politics in the EU referendum with the Scottish independence referendum. It discusses how liberals and conservatives can become mobilised and actually displace traditional left/right political issues from the agenda in favour of cultural issues.
One particularly strong feature of Brexitland is the discussion of historical reactions to ethnic diversity produced by immigration after the Second World War as many subjects of the British Empire came to Britain resulting in an extremely strong backlash against rising ethnic diversity. They show how popular Enoch Powell's views were among the public and discuss how Edward Heath's humanitarian decision to allow Ugandan refugees to settle in Britain cost him dearly.
They also highlight the importance of policy options to alleviate the backlash against immigration. Thatcher successfully used strict immigration policy to win over these ethnocentric identity conservative voters to her leadership. Something Blair, Brown and Cameron were unable to do as a result of EU membership.
There are however a few shortcomings of Sobolewska and Ford's explanation of identity politics driving British political behaviour. First, they repeatedly note the importance of educational expansion in creating the identity liberal group but they never explain why university expansion creates this alternative form of identity politics. Why is it that citizens who go to university are socially liberal? This is a consistent trend seen across countries. Is it simply socialisation whereby young liberals meet other young liberals from different backgrounds thus solidifying liberal beliefs on average? Or could it be something else. They do not say.
Ethnocentrism could have been discussed with a clearer delineation from related concepts like nativism, xenophobia and authoritarianism. They reference the important work of Karen Stenner in explaining the activation of ethnocentrism in British politics, but they seem unsure of whether ethnocentrism is a product of authoritarianism or something else. More discussion of this link and extra clarity when discussing their concepts would have been helpful.
The final issue I would have liked to see discussed is what constitutes racism and why the boundaries of racism shift. They avoid actually defining and discussing what constitutes racism in their view despite the abundance of available literature. They say that as anti-racism norms move quickly this leaves behind the identity conservatives who legitimately believe that racism is constantly shifting to encompass their legitimate resentments. What this misses is that racism is not a static phenomenon and that political actors can still use racism to their political advantage. Once it became politically unacceptable to discuss the racial inferiority of Black Americans, new coded racist dog whistles were used by the Nixon campaign to appeal to racist voters. This is one obvious reason why norms around racism will shift over time.
Brexitland is an interesting political science book which analyses the role of identity politics in British political history and compares the configuration of identity politics in the EU referendum with the Scottish independence referendum. It discusses how liberals and conservatives can become mobilised and actually displace traditional left/right political issues from the agenda in favour of cultural issues.
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