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A review by jameshafoster
Brexitland: Identity, Diversity and the Reshaping of British Politics by Robert Ford, Maria Sobolewska
3.0
The transformational processes of university expansion and rising ethnic diversity driven by mass immigration have produced a steady accumulation of demographic pressure in the electoral system, as the composition of the electorate has changed and new fault lines have emerged.
These demographic changes opened up new divides between ‘identity conservatives’ – white school leavers with an ethnocentric ‘us against them’ worldview – and ‘identity liberals’ – university graduates and ethnic minorities for whom anti-racism is a central social and political value.
The first wave of mass immigration in the 1960s began the process of ethnic change and triggered the first mass political mobilisation of these identity conflicts. Then, decades later, a second wave of immigration interacted with a political system where old loyalties were decaying, mobilising identity conflicts which have been working their way through the political system ever since.
There was growing evidence in the 2000s and early 2010s that the great tectonic plates of traditional party politics were beginning to shudder and creak under the accumulated pressures: New Labour’s persistent troubles with immigration; the backfiring Conservative pledge on migration control; the emergence of UKIP, all were symptoms of a system under strain.
The 2016 EU Referendum triggered the earthquake that released decades of built-up pressure, mobilising the identity divides which had been building for many years and forging them into new Leave and Remain political identities.
While the ethnocentric impulse to see politics as an ‘us against them’ battle is fundamental, the nature of the identity conflicts which activate such impulses depends on the political context. In England and Wales, ethnocentric voters have come to see first immigrants, and then the EU, as the primary threat, the ‘them’ that ‘we’ must control.
In Scotland, the same voters see England and Westminster as ‘them’, and often see immigrants and the EU as allies against this primary threat. Identity liberals are also sensitive to political context. Such voters regarded the immigration-focused mobilisation of ethnocentric sentiments in England and Wales as a violation of anti-racism social norms, and therefore strongly rejected both UKIP and the Leave campaign as agents of intolerance.
In Scotland, by contrast, though the SNP and Yes campaigns mobilised ethnocentric sentiments against England and Westminster, they also framed their political goal of independence in terms of progressive values, enabling a campaign which at root involved an ‘us against them’ battle palatable to voters on the liberal side of the identity politics divide.
The forces unleashed by the referendums have reshaped British political competition, changing both main parties. The David Cameron-led Conservative Party that called the referendum in 2016 was one where (grudging) acceptance of EU membership as being in Britain’s national interest was the norm.
The Boris Johnson-led Conservative Party, which won a massive election mandate three years later, is one where British EU membership is anathema, and even close post-Brexit alignment with the EU is regarded with suspicion.
The Labour Party of 2016 was one that sought to balance the interests of the large cohort of Labour MPs from the most strongly Remain constituencies with those of an equally large cohort of Labour MPs from the most strongly Leave seats. The Labour Party of 2020 is now dominated by MPs from identity liberal Remain-voting areas, but also reeling from a wave of historic defeats in longstanding, but Leave-voting, strongholds.
While both traditional governing parties have been shaken internally by the mobilisation of new identity politics conflicts, other parties have sought at various points to capitalise on the new divisions. UKIP and its rebranded successor the Brexit Party both caused turmoil by mobilising ethnocentric voters with an extreme ‘us against them’ message focused on assertive nationalism and opposition to the threats from Europe and immigration. The Liberal Democrats and the Green Party experienced polling surges by seeking to mobilise cosmopolitan, Europhile and anti-racist voters on the identity liberal end of the spectrum.
Thus far, new parties have failed to break the traditional two-party duopoly, but the summer 2019 polling surges for the Liberal Democrats and the Brexit Party highlight the fragility of the old order in a political context where new identity conflicts continue to reshape loyalties.
The changes in Scottish politics since 2014 highlight how a polarising identity conflict – over Scottish independence in this instance – can upend the political order and replace it with an entirely new pattern of party competition.
The demographic changes producing this new instability are unstoppable. This process has not ended with Brexit, indeed it is likely to accelerate in decades to come as the cohorts who came of age before the advent of mass higher education and mass immigration fade away and are replaced by the most highly educated and ethnically diverse generations Britain has ever seen. Every year Britain’s politicians will face an electorate that is a little more diverse and a little more university educated. Every year the ethnocentric electorate of white school leavers will get a little smaller.
Such electoral climate change is unstoppable, creating unavoidable dilemmas for political parties, but as we have argued throughout this book, the parties are not spectators in this process – the choices they make in responding to these changes inform the way voters understand the conflicts they generate, framing how new and old divides are packaged together, and structuring the choices available to voters.
America’s recent political experience suggests that identity liberals, too, can mobilise politically in response to the emergence of a salient threat – in this case the threat identity liberals perceive from President Trump and his supporters. A similar ‘awokening’ process could occur in Britain if younger white graduates react to Brexit-related disruptions, or the emergence of new English nationalist or anti-Muslim political movements, by coming to see white identity conservatives as a threatening out-group, and intensifying their commitment to anti-prejudice norms and the defence of minorities in response to this threat.
We have shown that the mobilisation of ethnocentrism is a powerful political weapon. Yet the political power of identity conservatives also reflected the weakness of their antagonists, who did not mobilise to the same extent in the years prior to the EU Referendum. Now that Brexit has given identity liberal voters a common political identity, a set of power grievances regarding the political status quo, and a belief that political opponents pose a threat to their core values, politicians on the liberal left may have an opportunity to mobilise their side of the identity politics divide more effectively. The past decade has belonged to those who activated and mobilised identity conservatives. The next decades may belong to those who learn to do the same with identity liberals.
These demographic changes opened up new divides between ‘identity conservatives’ – white school leavers with an ethnocentric ‘us against them’ worldview – and ‘identity liberals’ – university graduates and ethnic minorities for whom anti-racism is a central social and political value.
The first wave of mass immigration in the 1960s began the process of ethnic change and triggered the first mass political mobilisation of these identity conflicts. Then, decades later, a second wave of immigration interacted with a political system where old loyalties were decaying, mobilising identity conflicts which have been working their way through the political system ever since.
There was growing evidence in the 2000s and early 2010s that the great tectonic plates of traditional party politics were beginning to shudder and creak under the accumulated pressures: New Labour’s persistent troubles with immigration; the backfiring Conservative pledge on migration control; the emergence of UKIP, all were symptoms of a system under strain.
The 2016 EU Referendum triggered the earthquake that released decades of built-up pressure, mobilising the identity divides which had been building for many years and forging them into new Leave and Remain political identities.
While the ethnocentric impulse to see politics as an ‘us against them’ battle is fundamental, the nature of the identity conflicts which activate such impulses depends on the political context. In England and Wales, ethnocentric voters have come to see first immigrants, and then the EU, as the primary threat, the ‘them’ that ‘we’ must control.
In Scotland, the same voters see England and Westminster as ‘them’, and often see immigrants and the EU as allies against this primary threat. Identity liberals are also sensitive to political context. Such voters regarded the immigration-focused mobilisation of ethnocentric sentiments in England and Wales as a violation of anti-racism social norms, and therefore strongly rejected both UKIP and the Leave campaign as agents of intolerance.
In Scotland, by contrast, though the SNP and Yes campaigns mobilised ethnocentric sentiments against England and Westminster, they also framed their political goal of independence in terms of progressive values, enabling a campaign which at root involved an ‘us against them’ battle palatable to voters on the liberal side of the identity politics divide.
The forces unleashed by the referendums have reshaped British political competition, changing both main parties. The David Cameron-led Conservative Party that called the referendum in 2016 was one where (grudging) acceptance of EU membership as being in Britain’s national interest was the norm.
The Boris Johnson-led Conservative Party, which won a massive election mandate three years later, is one where British EU membership is anathema, and even close post-Brexit alignment with the EU is regarded with suspicion.
The Labour Party of 2016 was one that sought to balance the interests of the large cohort of Labour MPs from the most strongly Remain constituencies with those of an equally large cohort of Labour MPs from the most strongly Leave seats. The Labour Party of 2020 is now dominated by MPs from identity liberal Remain-voting areas, but also reeling from a wave of historic defeats in longstanding, but Leave-voting, strongholds.
While both traditional governing parties have been shaken internally by the mobilisation of new identity politics conflicts, other parties have sought at various points to capitalise on the new divisions. UKIP and its rebranded successor the Brexit Party both caused turmoil by mobilising ethnocentric voters with an extreme ‘us against them’ message focused on assertive nationalism and opposition to the threats from Europe and immigration. The Liberal Democrats and the Green Party experienced polling surges by seeking to mobilise cosmopolitan, Europhile and anti-racist voters on the identity liberal end of the spectrum.
Thus far, new parties have failed to break the traditional two-party duopoly, but the summer 2019 polling surges for the Liberal Democrats and the Brexit Party highlight the fragility of the old order in a political context where new identity conflicts continue to reshape loyalties.
The changes in Scottish politics since 2014 highlight how a polarising identity conflict – over Scottish independence in this instance – can upend the political order and replace it with an entirely new pattern of party competition.
The demographic changes producing this new instability are unstoppable. This process has not ended with Brexit, indeed it is likely to accelerate in decades to come as the cohorts who came of age before the advent of mass higher education and mass immigration fade away and are replaced by the most highly educated and ethnically diverse generations Britain has ever seen. Every year Britain’s politicians will face an electorate that is a little more diverse and a little more university educated. Every year the ethnocentric electorate of white school leavers will get a little smaller.
Such electoral climate change is unstoppable, creating unavoidable dilemmas for political parties, but as we have argued throughout this book, the parties are not spectators in this process – the choices they make in responding to these changes inform the way voters understand the conflicts they generate, framing how new and old divides are packaged together, and structuring the choices available to voters.
America’s recent political experience suggests that identity liberals, too, can mobilise politically in response to the emergence of a salient threat – in this case the threat identity liberals perceive from President Trump and his supporters. A similar ‘awokening’ process could occur in Britain if younger white graduates react to Brexit-related disruptions, or the emergence of new English nationalist or anti-Muslim political movements, by coming to see white identity conservatives as a threatening out-group, and intensifying their commitment to anti-prejudice norms and the defence of minorities in response to this threat.
We have shown that the mobilisation of ethnocentrism is a powerful political weapon. Yet the political power of identity conservatives also reflected the weakness of their antagonists, who did not mobilise to the same extent in the years prior to the EU Referendum. Now that Brexit has given identity liberal voters a common political identity, a set of power grievances regarding the political status quo, and a belief that political opponents pose a threat to their core values, politicians on the liberal left may have an opportunity to mobilise their side of the identity politics divide more effectively. The past decade has belonged to those who activated and mobilised identity conservatives. The next decades may belong to those who learn to do the same with identity liberals.