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A review by ageorgiadis
The Constitution of Knowledge by Jonathan Rauch
3.0
The idea that obnoxious, misguided, seditious, blasphemous, and bigoted expressions deserve not only to be tolerated but, of all things, protected is the single most counterintuitive social principle in all of human history.
-p18-19
Well-intentioned but not going to be effective for those who need it most.
The Constitution of Knowledge supposes that there are explicit and implicit rules for “what we know”. The development of Western Civilization, Enlightenment values, and philosophy make the foundation of these rules. Like a political constitution, they also rely on moral actors and unwritten good faith on the part of the participants (in the case of knowledge, all of humanity). This is indeed the problem.
If your social reputation and group identity depend upon believing something, then you will find a way to believe it.
-p24
Rauch also does a good job of explaining that this COK is what we know collectively, and isn’t exclusive information available to a rarified group. For example, I found his rebuke to wokeness and moral grandstanding to be firm and clear.
If I claim access to divine revelation, or if I claim the support of miracles which only believers can witness, or if I claim that my class or race or historically dominant status or historically oppressed status allows me to know and say things which others cannot, then I am breaking the empirical rule by exempting my views from contestability by others.
-p90
If we are debating same-sex marriage, I may mention my experience as a gay person, and my experience may (I hope) be relevant. In fact, good scientific practice requires researchers to disclose their personal equities so as to surface conflicts of interest. But statements about personal standing and interest inform the conversation; they do not control it, dominate it, or end it.
-p91
Nothing is true because it represents some person’s or group’s point of view or lived experience.
-p103
However, this book is quite verbose, a little repetitive, and full of long run-on lists punctuated by many commas, and mere humans can’t read these sentences and absorb them meaningfully. It is also targeted towards a The Atlantic-level audience, who probably knows these lessons already. For example, when talking about how humans tend to repeat bad information, and after a while the bad information may make it back to the source (ie. the person who first disseminated the bad information), it further reinforces their existing wrong view even though they, in fact, started it. Rauch explains:
“The result can be to reverse the epistemic valence of critical persuasion so that it points away from reality, even in the face of countervailing evidence.” If you can read and understand that sentence, it’s unlikely you need help with the Constitution of Knowledge.
-p18-19
Well-intentioned but not going to be effective for those who need it most.
The Constitution of Knowledge supposes that there are explicit and implicit rules for “what we know”. The development of Western Civilization, Enlightenment values, and philosophy make the foundation of these rules. Like a political constitution, they also rely on moral actors and unwritten good faith on the part of the participants (in the case of knowledge, all of humanity). This is indeed the problem.
If your social reputation and group identity depend upon believing something, then you will find a way to believe it.
-p24
Rauch also does a good job of explaining that this COK is what we know collectively, and isn’t exclusive information available to a rarified group. For example, I found his rebuke to wokeness and moral grandstanding to be firm and clear.
If I claim access to divine revelation, or if I claim the support of miracles which only believers can witness, or if I claim that my class or race or historically dominant status or historically oppressed status allows me to know and say things which others cannot, then I am breaking the empirical rule by exempting my views from contestability by others.
-p90
If we are debating same-sex marriage, I may mention my experience as a gay person, and my experience may (I hope) be relevant. In fact, good scientific practice requires researchers to disclose their personal equities so as to surface conflicts of interest. But statements about personal standing and interest inform the conversation; they do not control it, dominate it, or end it.
-p91
Nothing is true because it represents some person’s or group’s point of view or lived experience.
-p103
However, this book is quite verbose, a little repetitive, and full of long run-on lists punctuated by many commas, and mere humans can’t read these sentences and absorb them meaningfully. It is also targeted towards a The Atlantic-level audience, who probably knows these lessons already. For example, when talking about how humans tend to repeat bad information, and after a while the bad information may make it back to the source (ie. the person who first disseminated the bad information), it further reinforces their existing wrong view even though they, in fact, started it. Rauch explains:
“The result can be to reverse the epistemic valence of critical persuasion so that it points away from reality, even in the face of countervailing evidence.” If you can read and understand that sentence, it’s unlikely you need help with the Constitution of Knowledge.