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A review by branch_c
Not Born Yesterday: The Science of Who We Trust and What We Believe by Hugo Mercier
4.0
This book makes a well-presented case that people are not as gullible as they're often claimed to be; rather, what appears to be gullibility is a tendency to follow "evolutionarily valid cue[s]" (p. 73) - including, importantly, the behavior and persuasive efforts of others in our environment.
While there's a lot of concern about fake news and propaganda, the evidence presented here suggests that people are not typically fooled or convinced to act against their interests. Rather, they choose to believe, support, and join groups that already offer something advantageous to them. When the leaders of those groups promulgate information in an effort to persuade people to behave in certain ways, it's not necessarily the information that causes the behavior change. Instead, the information provides a justification for people to behave in ways that they were already inclined toward anyway. Regarding the sentiment attributed to Voltaire that "Those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities", Mercier points out that "this is in fact rarely true. As a rule, it is wanting to commit atrocities that makes you believe absurdities." (p. 202)
I learned at least a few things from this book, including the fact that in some languages, the grammar rules require that you "specify how you acquired a given piece of information." (p. 168) Mercier also puts forth a theory explaining the proliferation of blatantly obvious email scams. He points out that "while sending millions of messages was practically free, responding to them cost the scammers time and energy." Therefore, they may have made the messages "voluntarily preposterous. In this way, the scammers ensured that any effort spent engaging with individuals would only be spent on the most promising marks." (p. 251) Hard to say whether this theory is true, but I haven't heard any better explanation for what we observe.
Mercier allows that it still makes sense to combat authoritarianism, misinformation, and other sources of false beliefs, but suggests that we shouldn't expect this to prevent people from making "wrong" decisions that they see as being advantageous to them. The points made here are both heartening (misinformation isn't as damaging as we might have thought) and depressing (people will behave badly anyway as long as it's in their interest to do so).
The one thing I take issue with is the idea that we need to recognize and be sympathetic to people's unstated desires and goals, rather than whether they actually believe what they profess to. While there may be social value in this, it seems to me that we need to take what people claim to believe at face value - it's both patronizing and unfair to do otherwise, and claim that we know what they "really" believe. It seems obvious to me that it should be socially unacceptable to profess something known to be false in order to gain some personal advantage.
In any case, that's a tangential issue; Mercier's main points about trust and belief are solid and intriguing, and this book is a clearly written exposition of those points.
While there's a lot of concern about fake news and propaganda, the evidence presented here suggests that people are not typically fooled or convinced to act against their interests. Rather, they choose to believe, support, and join groups that already offer something advantageous to them. When the leaders of those groups promulgate information in an effort to persuade people to behave in certain ways, it's not necessarily the information that causes the behavior change. Instead, the information provides a justification for people to behave in ways that they were already inclined toward anyway. Regarding the sentiment attributed to Voltaire that "Those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities", Mercier points out that "this is in fact rarely true. As a rule, it is wanting to commit atrocities that makes you believe absurdities." (p. 202)
I learned at least a few things from this book, including the fact that in some languages, the grammar rules require that you "specify how you acquired a given piece of information." (p. 168) Mercier also puts forth a theory explaining the proliferation of blatantly obvious email scams. He points out that "while sending millions of messages was practically free, responding to them cost the scammers time and energy." Therefore, they may have made the messages "voluntarily preposterous. In this way, the scammers ensured that any effort spent engaging with individuals would only be spent on the most promising marks." (p. 251) Hard to say whether this theory is true, but I haven't heard any better explanation for what we observe.
Mercier allows that it still makes sense to combat authoritarianism, misinformation, and other sources of false beliefs, but suggests that we shouldn't expect this to prevent people from making "wrong" decisions that they see as being advantageous to them. The points made here are both heartening (misinformation isn't as damaging as we might have thought) and depressing (people will behave badly anyway as long as it's in their interest to do so).
The one thing I take issue with is the idea that we need to recognize and be sympathetic to people's unstated desires and goals, rather than whether they actually believe what they profess to. While there may be social value in this, it seems to me that we need to take what people claim to believe at face value - it's both patronizing and unfair to do otherwise, and claim that we know what they "really" believe. It seems obvious to me that it should be socially unacceptable to profess something known to be false in order to gain some personal advantage.
In any case, that's a tangential issue; Mercier's main points about trust and belief are solid and intriguing, and this book is a clearly written exposition of those points.