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outcolder's review against another edition
4.0
If Blackmore were a jazz trumpeter, she'd be blowin' right up Dennett's butt. Still, considering she is far less obnoxious than he is and that this is one of those slim "very short introductions," it's a much easier task than his [b:Consciousness Explained|2069|Consciousness Explained|Daniel C. Dennett|https://d.gr-assets.com/books/1386924714s/2069.jpg|1860288]. I appreciate that Blackmore is clearly experienced in the Jimi Hendrix sense of the word but I question whether the conclusion that 'consciousness is a delusion' really should automatically lead to the conclusion that we should try to accept that and live accordingly. I suspect that the illusion of consciousness has some very important survival functions. Maybe the conclusion ought to be that I should do more to strengthen the illusion that I am the same person I was a minute ago ... for example, keep a diary ... and not do what Blackmore seems to insist is the correct thing, namely, meditate my mind away. This book was a fun ride, and I like thinking that one day self-aware computers might conclude that consciousness is a delusion even though we humans are perfectly prepared to attribute feelings and consciousness to everything from dirt to sock puppets.
yates9's review against another edition
4.0
Generally a very good introduction, slightly disappointed in the fragmentary content at the end of the book about abnormal states if consciousness.
anne_sophie's review against another edition
4.5
VSI Reality x VSI Animal Behaviour (but more accessible)
radbear76's review against another edition
5.0
It's been awhile since I read about consciousness and/or neurology. This book did a great job of refreshing my memory on the topic and reminding me of just how trippy consciousness is.
egerbosch_dobgirl99's review against another edition
informative
reflective
relaxing
slow-paced
3.75
sbenzell's review against another edition
3.0
I enjoyed this refresher on some basic 'philosophy of mind' material. Obviously not everything can be covered in such a short book, but I wish more time had been spent on embodiment, idealism, and pansychism -- the last in particular.
The book is spicy in that the author takes a view from the beginning she defines as "delusionism" the idea that consciousness (or at least what we normally think of as consciousness) is a delusion. Now, to me, calling consciousness itself an illusion or delusion is question begging (what is the agent who is misled?) but I am certainly sympathetic to the idea that the lay-conception of individual identity is seriously flawed (Parfait perhaps makes the best version of this argument). I don't find particularly persuasive evidence from meditation about this: why should I be surprised (or should it be an argument against traditional theories of mind) that if I --use my conscious will -- to egnage in meditative practice over and over again that I can have a different sort of conscious experience?
Overall I do like the fact that the author takes a stand, but I found the last chapter, which I hoped would provide a full explanation, highly unsatisfying. It concludes that 'of course' -- experiences -- exist, but says consciousness does not. Waaa? I wish the author had more time to explain how she squares this circle, because right now it just seems like she's shifting the hard problem one concept over (from 'consciousness' to 'experience').
The book is spicy in that the author takes a view from the beginning she defines as "delusionism" the idea that consciousness (or at least what we normally think of as consciousness) is a delusion. Now, to me, calling consciousness itself an illusion or delusion is question begging (what is the agent who is misled?) but I am certainly sympathetic to the idea that the lay-conception of individual identity is seriously flawed (Parfait perhaps makes the best version of this argument). I don't find particularly persuasive evidence from meditation about this: why should I be surprised (or should it be an argument against traditional theories of mind) that if I --use my conscious will -- to egnage in meditative practice over and over again that I can have a different sort of conscious experience?
Overall I do like the fact that the author takes a stand, but I found the last chapter, which I hoped would provide a full explanation, highly unsatisfying. It concludes that 'of course' -- experiences -- exist, but says consciousness does not. Waaa? I wish the author had more time to explain how she squares this circle, because right now it just seems like she's shifting the hard problem one concept over (from 'consciousness' to 'experience').
ajkeller's review against another edition
adventurous
challenging
informative
mysterious
medium-paced
4.5
royourboat's review against another edition
3.5
Between this and some other stuff I’ve been reading lately, I discovered that I really really really am not interested in learning about consciousness.
slushhhhy's review against another edition
informative
slow-paced
3.5
For a short book it felt quite long.