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sidharthvardhan's review against another edition
5.0
So, Socrates finds, for a change, someone who knows how to argue. At least twice was Socrates inconsistent - himself making long speeches while showing his hatred for them and then, starting discussion about poets only to conclude that it is something that wise people don't do.
The best part is towards the end, where some philosophy is actually established - that no one knowingly does evil; and all evil point towards lack of wisdom. Socrates points out that all virtues, specially courage, in true sense is wisdom. This wisdom or knowledge, is not any knowledge but knowledge of measurement. One is turned towards evil because he is deceived by appearances; and if he/she was taught the art of measuring the good derived from something then that person shall not commit evil (because no one knowingly commits evil.) If you think it is absurd, than go ahead and read the dialogue.
The central question is whether virtue can be taught - for that is what sophists like Protagoras do. At first Socrates is denying and Protagoras accepting it to be true; but by the end they are arguing for opposite ends and Socrates proves that virtue, being nothing but wisdom, can be taught.
The best part is towards the end, where some philosophy is actually established - that no one knowingly does evil; and all evil point towards lack of wisdom. Socrates points out that all virtues, specially courage, in true sense is wisdom. This wisdom or knowledge, is not any knowledge but knowledge of measurement. One is turned towards evil because he is deceived by appearances; and if he/she was taught the art of measuring the good derived from something then that person shall not commit evil (because no one knowingly commits evil.) If you think it is absurd, than go ahead and read the dialogue.
The central question is whether virtue can be taught - for that is what sophists like Protagoras do. At first Socrates is denying and Protagoras accepting it to be true; but by the end they are arguing for opposite ends and Socrates proves that virtue, being nothing but wisdom, can be taught.
cryo_guy's review against another edition
5.0
~~"Socrates, why is it necessary for us to investigate the opinion of ordinary people, who will say whatever occurs to them?"~~
I've read the Protagoras before, but I wanted to give it a quick read through because the other book I'm reading (Nussbaum's The Fragility of Goodness) speaks about it and it's pretty short. What I remember most about the dialogue is the above quote, which I've always held in honor as amusing, and that Socrates makes an "expert" look stupid. What I had forgotten was that this was about being a sophist, a topic of particular interest to Socrates himself, whether a sophist can do what he claims, and what exactly that is. The dialogue also features Plato's characteristic double frame--Socrates is relating the story of his afternoon with Protagoras (and a host of others) to an unspecified friend.
But first I want to say something about the intro by Michael Frede. I've read a few of his papers and I've learned his Platonic talking points pretty well. First and foremost, Socrates is engaging in a specific kind of conversation called the elenchus with Protagoras and others (which he specifies). A somewhat rigorous yes and no dialogue that results in a conclusion that necessarily follows from the beginning premise, a premise consented to by the respondent. In a modern context, Socrates can seem brash, unrelenting, and sarcastic, but these inflections are easily misunderstood without Frede's insight. In this dialogue in particular, awareness of this is important as Socrates exhibits his usual ironic punning and quoting, but he also maintains his insistence on the elenchus (so much so that they poll the audience and reach a consensus on how dialogue is to proceed) and makes overtures of collaborative definition clarification (or whatever you want to call it when Socrates explains that he is working with his interlocutor to become more clear on a subject even if they find that their path of reasoning is inconsistent and turns out to be useless towards that end. He especially makes these overtures in the Gorgias where Gorgias similarly becomes hesitant to reply among a group of peers and admirers when forced to make a contradictions of his "beliefs," i.e. premises he has assented to). At any rate I want to point out a few other things Frede brings up that I think are worth mentioning and then I'll move on to say a few things about the dialogue.
The main topic of the Protagoras is virtue. What is it? They come by the question because Protagoras, as a sophist, claims he can teach virtue to the youth. Socrates thinks virtue might be teachable but he has to know what it is first. Frede talks about how this was an issue for Athenians as a whole. The role of a citizen in Athens was evolving in the second half of the fifth century, traditional values were thought to be inadequate. He suggests this is what led to the rise of the sophist class- professional teachers who would see to the good upbringing of the children of wealthy aristocrats. At one point in the dialogue virtue is defined as a skillset: "how best to runs one's household, sound deliberation in one's own affairs, but also in the affairs of the city, and how one is best able to act and speak concerning them (318e4)." I just want to note that this is not just an issue of 5th century Athens, but one that should concern people today in America. It was interesting to me to try to morph the conversation of virtue and what it means to be a citizen into a modern context and whether we have the same ideas about professional teachers of this virtue or that it is the job of one's family to instill such virtues. I enjoyed revisiting this topic as it applies to myself ha.
He also helpfully elucidates Socrates positions on agency which is often described as "intellectualist." Socrates' professed notion, that if a person knows what is good, they can't do other than that: namely, what is good. While simple, logically, this principle reduces a much more complicated process of understanding and moral evaluation that I think anyone would acknowledge. And it is true to that in some contexts the principle is not useless. But of course things aren't as simple as it being true or false; Socrates uses this bit of reasoning as something that logically flows (therefore suiting the elenchus), to lead his interlocutors to aporia and usually not as a statement of his beliefs or even a convincing truth that comes as a conclusion to an argument. Frede doesn't say all that, but he does clarify the principle Socrates "holds": that virtue is a matter of wisdom; good a matter of knowledge.
On the unity of virtue or virtues, which in the dialogue involves addressing whether courage, wisdom, temperance, and justice are wholly different or similar virtues, Frede: "Hence the problem of the unity of virtue is a problem of interpretation for the Protagoras, but it is also a philosophical problem which will occupy Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. And it is a problem which should also occupy us. For when we think about what kind of person we ideally would want to be like, we also have to ask ourselves whether the list of features we find desirable just constitutes, as it were, a shopping-list, or whether, as seems likely, they are systematically related so as to form some kind of unity which goes beyond their being severally desirable features. How do we make comparisons and judge people, if there are a number of different and perhaps even independent relevant features?"
He also helpfully talks about how this dialogue uses one of the earliest occurrences in Plato of self predication, an issue which continually emerges in many of his dialogues. In short, Socrates uses the Greek "the odd" (neuter adj, "to") to designate the abstract quality off oddness. In the course of various elenchoi, he makes the point (or some variation) that oddness is odd/wetness is wet. To us the quality does not itself possess the quality which it is, but when using the neuter to abstract such a quality you can see how the two senses have overlap.
Another necessarily clarification si the translation of sophrosune, which is most often "temperance" and "self-restraint," but he says a closer rendering is "soundness of mind." This gives insight into the relationship of virtues discussion in the dialogue where sophrosune is a part of virtue.
He mentions akrasia in connection with the intellectualist ideas I spoke of earlier later in the intro. He describes more about how there is a calculus of pleasure and pain, and a very logic way of viewing the passions which constitute beliefs. Rather than knowledge having a special power, it is belief: Whatever a person believes to be good, they will do.
So these are Frede's insights as I see them. the whole intro is worth a read, but those are the ones that made me stop.
On the Protagoras:
First, I'll say that the translation was very good, Stanley Lombardo and Karen Bell. I haven't run across Bell, but I've read a few Lombardo translations including the Theogony, parts of the Iliad and Odyssey, and some of the tragedies. I always remember his way of translating being very competent but filled with hidden folksy lingo as if to bring the translation to life with the American dialect. In this, I noted Lombardo's folksy technique with a stray "What's up?" and a few "I reckons" and perhaps more I've forgotten.
My first observation was on sophists. When Socrates and Hippocrates are dicussing before leaving to see Protagoras, Socrates asks what profession Protagoras is and Hippocrates replies, "A sophist is what they call him anyway." But when Hippocrates faces the truth that, as sculptors produce sculptors of their students, sophists must produce sophists, he expresses chagrin and shame that he should be so named. Nonetheless, he desires to procure the services of such a person. It always interesting to me the duality that the position of sophist had in Athens in the 5th century. The label was slapped on Socrates for his questioning behavior and used to powerful effect in court. On other occasions you hear that sophists are the highest paid profession in Athens. Aristocrats want to pay them exorbitant sums, but wouldn't be caught dead being called one. Examining any particular historical figure labeled a sophist, you may find a genuine tutor of youths, or you might find a philosopher, writer, poet, scientist or some other variety. And in later centuries, the position becomes a much less controversial orator/rhetorician.
I really love Protagoras' first long speech where he gives a mythology account of why all men are held to be just and then an explanation for why an individual is held accountable for being just unlike other things that are natural processes or matters of chance. They are great companion pieces and the myth itself, as an adaptation of Prometheus' stealing fire has influenced many retellings of the story. It makes the explicit the connection between Epimetheus' thoughtlessness and Prometheus' act of rebellion and also Epimetheus accepting Pandora.
I liked catching the brief comments on the type of dialogue they were having and Protagoras' responses. Related is that Socrates is reporting the story, so we get not only Protagoras' verbal responses but Socrates also tells his expressions and reactions:
"I am primarily interested in testing the argument, although it may happen both that the questioner, myself, and my respondent wind up being tested."
"I could see that Protagoras was really worked up and struggling by now and that he was dead set against answering any more. Accordingly, I modified the tone of my questions."
I was surprised by a longer section towards the end that involved Socrates and Protagoras interpreting a poem of Simonides. Socrates interprets the poem incorrectly so that he can use the logic as steps in his argument. Usually, I think he a little more deft when making bad arguments. This one seemed obvious and frankly, self-serving. But maybe I need to give it another look over.
I don't have much else to say about the content of the dialogue other than Socrates gets Protagoras' goat. Alcibiades defends Socrates which intimates his amorous feelings. There's a funny little bit about Laconic brevity that I had forgotten. Socrates makes a whole point of it just to try to curry favor for his preferred method of dialogue. So shameless! As far as what virtue actually is? Well I think it's a bunch of overlapping things, many of which have to do with knowledge, but others of which have more to do with learning. I still love that quote by Protagoras at the top and I think it speaks volumes-about his exasperation with Socrates, but also about the position of the sophist in society, their perspective towards others and vice versa.
OH, I also wanted to mention that we have no extant writings of Protagoras but through fragments we think he wrote something on relativism called "Truth" or "Refutations." He may have even been the first to put forth ideas of relativism. But curiously enough none of that, his philosophizing, or his most famous quote "Man is the measure of all things (of things that are, that they are; of things that are not, that they are not)." is mentioned in the dialogue that bears his name. We see nothing of his intellectual pursuits save those of a sophist-refined speech, argumentation, reasoning, and eager to sell their wares to aristocrats. To be completely fair, his (and the other sophists') portrayals in the dialogue are not that negative, but neither are they exactly nuanced. Curiouslier enough, Protagoras famous man is the measure quote does feature prominently in another dialogue called the Theaetetus. Obviously Plato knew about it and Protagoras' writings (maybe?), but he chose not to insert that at all into the Protagoras. Which makes me think Protagoras was a very prominent public figure as a sophist, not that Plato was necessarily omitting that information on purpose.
Various quotes:
"For respect is guilelessly inherent in the souls of listeners, but praise is all too often merely a deceitful verbal expression." (Prodicus)
"For like is akin to like by nature, but convention, which tyrannizes the human race, often constrains us contrary to nature." (Hippias)
I've read the Protagoras before, but I wanted to give it a quick read through because the other book I'm reading (Nussbaum's The Fragility of Goodness) speaks about it and it's pretty short. What I remember most about the dialogue is the above quote, which I've always held in honor as amusing, and that Socrates makes an "expert" look stupid. What I had forgotten was that this was about being a sophist, a topic of particular interest to Socrates himself, whether a sophist can do what he claims, and what exactly that is. The dialogue also features Plato's characteristic double frame--Socrates is relating the story of his afternoon with Protagoras (and a host of others) to an unspecified friend.
But first I want to say something about the intro by Michael Frede. I've read a few of his papers and I've learned his Platonic talking points pretty well. First and foremost, Socrates is engaging in a specific kind of conversation called the elenchus with Protagoras and others (which he specifies). A somewhat rigorous yes and no dialogue that results in a conclusion that necessarily follows from the beginning premise, a premise consented to by the respondent. In a modern context, Socrates can seem brash, unrelenting, and sarcastic, but these inflections are easily misunderstood without Frede's insight. In this dialogue in particular, awareness of this is important as Socrates exhibits his usual ironic punning and quoting, but he also maintains his insistence on the elenchus (so much so that they poll the audience and reach a consensus on how dialogue is to proceed) and makes overtures of collaborative definition clarification (or whatever you want to call it when Socrates explains that he is working with his interlocutor to become more clear on a subject even if they find that their path of reasoning is inconsistent and turns out to be useless towards that end. He especially makes these overtures in the Gorgias where Gorgias similarly becomes hesitant to reply among a group of peers and admirers when forced to make a contradictions of his "beliefs," i.e. premises he has assented to). At any rate I want to point out a few other things Frede brings up that I think are worth mentioning and then I'll move on to say a few things about the dialogue.
The main topic of the Protagoras is virtue. What is it? They come by the question because Protagoras, as a sophist, claims he can teach virtue to the youth. Socrates thinks virtue might be teachable but he has to know what it is first. Frede talks about how this was an issue for Athenians as a whole. The role of a citizen in Athens was evolving in the second half of the fifth century, traditional values were thought to be inadequate. He suggests this is what led to the rise of the sophist class- professional teachers who would see to the good upbringing of the children of wealthy aristocrats. At one point in the dialogue virtue is defined as a skillset: "how best to runs one's household, sound deliberation in one's own affairs, but also in the affairs of the city, and how one is best able to act and speak concerning them (318e4)." I just want to note that this is not just an issue of 5th century Athens, but one that should concern people today in America. It was interesting to me to try to morph the conversation of virtue and what it means to be a citizen into a modern context and whether we have the same ideas about professional teachers of this virtue or that it is the job of one's family to instill such virtues. I enjoyed revisiting this topic as it applies to myself ha.
He also helpfully elucidates Socrates positions on agency which is often described as "intellectualist." Socrates' professed notion, that if a person knows what is good, they can't do other than that: namely, what is good. While simple, logically, this principle reduces a much more complicated process of understanding and moral evaluation that I think anyone would acknowledge. And it is true to that in some contexts the principle is not useless. But of course things aren't as simple as it being true or false; Socrates uses this bit of reasoning as something that logically flows (therefore suiting the elenchus), to lead his interlocutors to aporia and usually not as a statement of his beliefs or even a convincing truth that comes as a conclusion to an argument. Frede doesn't say all that, but he does clarify the principle Socrates "holds": that virtue is a matter of wisdom; good a matter of knowledge.
On the unity of virtue or virtues, which in the dialogue involves addressing whether courage, wisdom, temperance, and justice are wholly different or similar virtues, Frede: "Hence the problem of the unity of virtue is a problem of interpretation for the Protagoras, but it is also a philosophical problem which will occupy Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. And it is a problem which should also occupy us. For when we think about what kind of person we ideally would want to be like, we also have to ask ourselves whether the list of features we find desirable just constitutes, as it were, a shopping-list, or whether, as seems likely, they are systematically related so as to form some kind of unity which goes beyond their being severally desirable features. How do we make comparisons and judge people, if there are a number of different and perhaps even independent relevant features?"
He also helpfully talks about how this dialogue uses one of the earliest occurrences in Plato of self predication, an issue which continually emerges in many of his dialogues. In short, Socrates uses the Greek "the odd" (neuter adj, "to") to designate the abstract quality off oddness. In the course of various elenchoi, he makes the point (or some variation) that oddness is odd/wetness is wet. To us the quality does not itself possess the quality which it is, but when using the neuter to abstract such a quality you can see how the two senses have overlap.
Another necessarily clarification si the translation of sophrosune, which is most often "temperance" and "self-restraint," but he says a closer rendering is "soundness of mind." This gives insight into the relationship of virtues discussion in the dialogue where sophrosune is a part of virtue.
He mentions akrasia in connection with the intellectualist ideas I spoke of earlier later in the intro. He describes more about how there is a calculus of pleasure and pain, and a very logic way of viewing the passions which constitute beliefs. Rather than knowledge having a special power, it is belief: Whatever a person believes to be good, they will do.
So these are Frede's insights as I see them. the whole intro is worth a read, but those are the ones that made me stop.
On the Protagoras:
First, I'll say that the translation was very good, Stanley Lombardo and Karen Bell. I haven't run across Bell, but I've read a few Lombardo translations including the Theogony, parts of the Iliad and Odyssey, and some of the tragedies. I always remember his way of translating being very competent but filled with hidden folksy lingo as if to bring the translation to life with the American dialect. In this, I noted Lombardo's folksy technique with a stray "What's up?" and a few "I reckons" and perhaps more I've forgotten.
My first observation was on sophists. When Socrates and Hippocrates are dicussing before leaving to see Protagoras, Socrates asks what profession Protagoras is and Hippocrates replies, "A sophist is what they call him anyway." But when Hippocrates faces the truth that, as sculptors produce sculptors of their students, sophists must produce sophists, he expresses chagrin and shame that he should be so named. Nonetheless, he desires to procure the services of such a person. It always interesting to me the duality that the position of sophist had in Athens in the 5th century. The label was slapped on Socrates for his questioning behavior and used to powerful effect in court. On other occasions you hear that sophists are the highest paid profession in Athens. Aristocrats want to pay them exorbitant sums, but wouldn't be caught dead being called one. Examining any particular historical figure labeled a sophist, you may find a genuine tutor of youths, or you might find a philosopher, writer, poet, scientist or some other variety. And in later centuries, the position becomes a much less controversial orator/rhetorician.
I really love Protagoras' first long speech where he gives a mythology account of why all men are held to be just and then an explanation for why an individual is held accountable for being just unlike other things that are natural processes or matters of chance. They are great companion pieces and the myth itself, as an adaptation of Prometheus' stealing fire has influenced many retellings of the story. It makes the explicit the connection between Epimetheus' thoughtlessness and Prometheus' act of rebellion and also Epimetheus accepting Pandora.
I liked catching the brief comments on the type of dialogue they were having and Protagoras' responses. Related is that Socrates is reporting the story, so we get not only Protagoras' verbal responses but Socrates also tells his expressions and reactions:
"I am primarily interested in testing the argument, although it may happen both that the questioner, myself, and my respondent wind up being tested."
"I could see that Protagoras was really worked up and struggling by now and that he was dead set against answering any more. Accordingly, I modified the tone of my questions."
I was surprised by a longer section towards the end that involved Socrates and Protagoras interpreting a poem of Simonides. Socrates interprets the poem incorrectly so that he can use the logic as steps in his argument. Usually, I think he a little more deft when making bad arguments. This one seemed obvious and frankly, self-serving. But maybe I need to give it another look over.
I don't have much else to say about the content of the dialogue other than Socrates gets Protagoras' goat. Alcibiades defends Socrates which intimates his amorous feelings. There's a funny little bit about Laconic brevity that I had forgotten. Socrates makes a whole point of it just to try to curry favor for his preferred method of dialogue. So shameless! As far as what virtue actually is? Well I think it's a bunch of overlapping things, many of which have to do with knowledge, but others of which have more to do with learning. I still love that quote by Protagoras at the top and I think it speaks volumes-about his exasperation with Socrates, but also about the position of the sophist in society, their perspective towards others and vice versa.
OH, I also wanted to mention that we have no extant writings of Protagoras but through fragments we think he wrote something on relativism called "Truth" or "Refutations." He may have even been the first to put forth ideas of relativism. But curiously enough none of that, his philosophizing, or his most famous quote "Man is the measure of all things (of things that are, that they are; of things that are not, that they are not)." is mentioned in the dialogue that bears his name. We see nothing of his intellectual pursuits save those of a sophist-refined speech, argumentation, reasoning, and eager to sell their wares to aristocrats. To be completely fair, his (and the other sophists') portrayals in the dialogue are not that negative, but neither are they exactly nuanced. Curiouslier enough, Protagoras famous man is the measure quote does feature prominently in another dialogue called the Theaetetus. Obviously Plato knew about it and Protagoras' writings (maybe?), but he chose not to insert that at all into the Protagoras. Which makes me think Protagoras was a very prominent public figure as a sophist, not that Plato was necessarily omitting that information on purpose.
Various quotes:
"For respect is guilelessly inherent in the souls of listeners, but praise is all too often merely a deceitful verbal expression." (Prodicus)
"For like is akin to like by nature, but convention, which tyrannizes the human race, often constrains us contrary to nature." (Hippias)
gregg_macdonald's review against another edition
3.0
I really feel like this dialogue opened the character of Socrates up more for me. In all the other dialogues, socrates trounces his counterparts, but here, protagoras held his own. And I dont even think he was entirely defeated. The middle part that diverged into a discussion of poetry was a bit dry. But otherwise it's a really neat dialogue.
authorjbr's review against another edition
5.0
Similar to Euthyphro, but now t quite as good( on first read, anyway).
leilanitaneza's review against another edition
All I know is Socrates = Ben Shapiro
duffypratt's review against another edition
4.0
This is maybe the only dialogue I've read which was actually a dialogue. So often, a Platonic dialogue consists of little more than Socrates asking a series of questions, some of them lasting for a page or more, and then his interlocutor giving a one to three word answer. Here, Protagoras stands up for his own views, and he seems to hold his own fairly well with Socrates. He's not simply a foil, or if he is, he is not a simple foil.
The structure of the dialogue also tends to meander more than usual, and this lends it a further air of authenticity. There is also a strong tension here between getting at the truth and winning the argument. Of course, Socrates protests that all he wants to do is to get to the bottom of what Protagoras thinks about virtue in general, and courage in particular. But it doesn't seem genuine. There's a strong sense here that everyone is waiting for a "gotcha" moment. And in the end, Socrates catches Protagoras in a trap, which effectively ends the dialogue. So, which is more important, getting at the truth or winning? I don't think the answer is at all clear.
There's one moment I especially liked. Socrates asks one of his typically leading questions, looking for a yes or no answer because either way he can lead Protagoras into a trap. Protagoras says its not so simple. He says that some things are expedient in some circumstances, but then not expedient in others, and he gives lots of varying examples. Socrates response is basically TLDR. He insists he's too dumb to take in such long answers, and wants Protagoras to give short simple answers. Then there is considerable debate about how the debate should run.
And better, when Protagoras takes the lead on asking questions, a poem gets mentioned. Socrates, who earlier said he wanted only short answers because he was too simple to grasp a speech, gives about a 5 page monologue on the meaning of the poem. There's lots of irony built into this dialogue, and it makes it fun. It also makes it harder to grasp exactly what Plato is trying to say, unless of course he's not trying to say anything, but rather to get the reader to think. And that means I probably should have spent more time on this.
The discussion of the relationship between pleasure and virtue was very interesting. It's the sort of thing that makes plausible the old chestnut that all Western philosophy is best understood as footnotes to Plato. But then, the discussion on courage and cowardice was pretty dreadful. The two are so far off the mark that it made it hard to take the conversation seriously.
The structure of the dialogue also tends to meander more than usual, and this lends it a further air of authenticity. There is also a strong tension here between getting at the truth and winning the argument. Of course, Socrates protests that all he wants to do is to get to the bottom of what Protagoras thinks about virtue in general, and courage in particular. But it doesn't seem genuine. There's a strong sense here that everyone is waiting for a "gotcha" moment. And in the end, Socrates catches Protagoras in a trap, which effectively ends the dialogue. So, which is more important, getting at the truth or winning? I don't think the answer is at all clear.
There's one moment I especially liked. Socrates asks one of his typically leading questions, looking for a yes or no answer because either way he can lead Protagoras into a trap. Protagoras says its not so simple. He says that some things are expedient in some circumstances, but then not expedient in others, and he gives lots of varying examples. Socrates response is basically TLDR. He insists he's too dumb to take in such long answers, and wants Protagoras to give short simple answers. Then there is considerable debate about how the debate should run.
And better, when Protagoras takes the lead on asking questions, a poem gets mentioned. Socrates, who earlier said he wanted only short answers because he was too simple to grasp a speech, gives about a 5 page monologue on the meaning of the poem. There's lots of irony built into this dialogue, and it makes it fun. It also makes it harder to grasp exactly what Plato is trying to say, unless of course he's not trying to say anything, but rather to get the reader to think. And that means I probably should have spent more time on this.
The discussion of the relationship between pleasure and virtue was very interesting. It's the sort of thing that makes plausible the old chestnut that all Western philosophy is best understood as footnotes to Plato. But then, the discussion on courage and cowardice was pretty dreadful. The two are so far off the mark that it made it hard to take the conversation seriously.
barryhaworth's review against another edition
4.0
Deciding to revisit something I read in my earlier days, this dialog was my introduction to Plato. In it we have an encounter between Socrates and a Sophist known as Protagoras, an engaging drama between two very different styles of argument. I remember that the first time I read it impressed me so that I re-read it almost immediately, making sure that I understood a little more of what was going on.
pyker's review against another edition
3.0
I really enjoyed reading this dialogue. It is short and concise and discusses many political issues that are still relevant. The issue is the conversation between Socrates and protagoras which unfortunately has the worst logic and lack of charm I have come across for a long time.