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branch_c's review against another edition
4.0
I didn't realize before starting this book that it would be a direct challenge to the "dual system" model of reason, which I found largely convincing when described by Daniel Kahneman. However, even as I agreed with much of Kahneman's book, I had some issues with it; for example, when presenting the case of how System 1 (intuitive) thinking gets things wrong, Kahneman references a study in which irrelevant information is taken into account when it shouldn't be (Thinking, Fast and Slow, p. 153). I commented at the time that "...the fact that the extra info is provided is interpreted as an unspoken request to take it into account. If it's technically wrong to do this, then offering the info is more or less a deliberate deception." In this book, Mercier and Sperber agree, pointing out that "Treating information that has been intentionally given to you as relevant isn't irrational - quite the contrary." (p. 33)
The authors consider reason, as understood in the traditional "intellectualist" approach, to be a "double enigma" (p. 4) in that it is often venerated as an evolutionarily provided superpower that separates humans from other animals, but at the same time it seems to be deeply flawed, in that we fail presumably simple tests of logic. Mercier and Sperber resolve the enigma by explaining that reason is simply a module that evolved along with other mechanisms of inference, and has two specific purposes: to justify our beliefs to ourselves, and to defend them in arguments with others - an "interactionist" approach. This approach is surprisingly powerful, explaining not only the clear benefits we get from the ability to reason, but also the apparent failures of this ability when we try to use for artificial tasks that it never evolved to address.
This book frames reason as a module contained within a larger set of mental functionality that can be considered "intuition", which in turn is a subset of a yet larger group of modules evolved for the purpose of "inference". Mental modules make sense to me, even if the details are yet to be resolved, and I think there's probably still room for Kahneman's System 1 / System 2 model as a way of conceptualizing different ways the mind works, as long as we keep in mind Mercier and Sperber's view that reasoning evolved to serve a purpose for humans, and it must have been successful in that purpose, otherwise we wouldn't have it. So rather than looking at System 1 as flawed because it allows logical errors and System 2 as flawed because it's slow, it's valuable to see both modes as aspects of a reason module that performs its function as it was evolved to do.
The authors' argument is clear and insightful, with examples of flawed reasoning from history that I wasn't familiar with, such as Linus Pauling's stubborn promotion of vitamin C as a miracle cure, and expert witness Bertillon's clearly contrived handwriting testimony in the Dreyfus affair. The authors use these examples and others to show not that reasoning is a flawed superpower, but that it fails predictably when applied in circumstances outside of those in which it evolved. Although it might be seen as cynical to reduce reason to a mechanism that reinforces our biases and lends itself to lazy thinking - when used by a single person in isolation - the authors also present evidence that when used in the environment for which it evolved - in collaboration with others - it does lead to improved convergence on the truth, which is, in the end, exactly what we'd hope that reason can do for us. There's plenty to think about here for anyone interested in how people actually think. Highly recommended!
The authors consider reason, as understood in the traditional "intellectualist" approach, to be a "double enigma" (p. 4) in that it is often venerated as an evolutionarily provided superpower that separates humans from other animals, but at the same time it seems to be deeply flawed, in that we fail presumably simple tests of logic. Mercier and Sperber resolve the enigma by explaining that reason is simply a module that evolved along with other mechanisms of inference, and has two specific purposes: to justify our beliefs to ourselves, and to defend them in arguments with others - an "interactionist" approach. This approach is surprisingly powerful, explaining not only the clear benefits we get from the ability to reason, but also the apparent failures of this ability when we try to use for artificial tasks that it never evolved to address.
This book frames reason as a module contained within a larger set of mental functionality that can be considered "intuition", which in turn is a subset of a yet larger group of modules evolved for the purpose of "inference". Mental modules make sense to me, even if the details are yet to be resolved, and I think there's probably still room for Kahneman's System 1 / System 2 model as a way of conceptualizing different ways the mind works, as long as we keep in mind Mercier and Sperber's view that reasoning evolved to serve a purpose for humans, and it must have been successful in that purpose, otherwise we wouldn't have it. So rather than looking at System 1 as flawed because it allows logical errors and System 2 as flawed because it's slow, it's valuable to see both modes as aspects of a reason module that performs its function as it was evolved to do.
The authors' argument is clear and insightful, with examples of flawed reasoning from history that I wasn't familiar with, such as Linus Pauling's stubborn promotion of vitamin C as a miracle cure, and expert witness Bertillon's clearly contrived handwriting testimony in the Dreyfus affair. The authors use these examples and others to show not that reasoning is a flawed superpower, but that it fails predictably when applied in circumstances outside of those in which it evolved. Although it might be seen as cynical to reduce reason to a mechanism that reinforces our biases and lends itself to lazy thinking - when used by a single person in isolation - the authors also present evidence that when used in the environment for which it evolved - in collaboration with others - it does lead to improved convergence on the truth, which is, in the end, exactly what we'd hope that reason can do for us. There's plenty to think about here for anyone interested in how people actually think. Highly recommended!
chrisyakimov's review
informative
inspiring
medium-paced
5.0
I've been waiting for this book for 25 years. If Kahnemann's "Thinking Fast and Slow" makes you want to pull your hair out in frustration, this is the book for you. A detailed, cogent, sufficiently incomplete (and therefore honest), and far and away more convincing theory for why we reason, why we seem to have "cognitive biases", and what how those biases are features, not flaws.
joaoeira's review
5.0
Probably best book I'll read this year. Need to go let it rest for a while then go through my notes one more time, and I'll write something about the ideas presented here.