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ralowe's review against another edition
5.0
sister. i was just having some connecting time with my close sibling simone de beauvoir about insurrecto-nihilsts. they have the atavistic fuckers in every age then, huh, like the mcflys. jeepers, the wheel-reinvention. i was like how did my journal get published in 1948? what are we gonna do about these corny weasels? her thought strays away from the ultimate fatalisms of existentialist absurdity but simply rests upon the vexing contingency of the nonsovereign, my buzzword of the hour. the body in the world is a mess, but it doesn't always have to be. you can clearly see the influence of merleau-ponty here, i want to believe she was a reader of his thinking. why does this feel like the first real book i've read? because it's a fucking dazzling light! simone de beauvoir! i have always loved ye! it's taken me so long to finally read her. back in the day nearly everyone i knew was kinda gloomy from nietzsche, sartre, hegel and i think people learn from these writers and i want to honor all that is productive in the gloom, but sometimes at the end when all is said and done, where's the celebration, optimism, comfort. lauren berlant said something about how stanley cavell said that the philosopher is no longer responsible for supplying comfort, but i've been such a noncoherent mess that i'm like totally still in the market for some. this is the book i will recommend to people who wonder about how to be in an absurd world as an existentialist and not be suicidal. not that suicide isn't the worst choice for people. it's really simple. we're all feeling existential nausea: recognition of this offers hope that we can struggle together with our nauseated selves. i was eager for someone writing in the merleau-ponty tradition, and this is it. we're not calling it love, it's something else. this is excellent to read with derrida's gift of death, how we're all abrahams left in the lurch with whether or not to slew our isaacs for god above. haraway too on companion species and her recent thought about getting on together through messiness of living and dying.
"the fact is that the man of action becomes a dictator not in respect to his ends but because these ends are necessarily set up through his will. hegel, in his phenomenology, has emphasized this inextricable confusion between objectivity and subjectivity." pp. 153-154
"but the idea of a total dialectic of history does not imply that any factor is ever determining; on the contrary, if one admits that the life of a man may change the course of events, it is that one adheres to the conception which grants a prepondrerant role to cleopatra's nose and cromwell's wart. one is here playing, with utter dishonesty, on two opposite conceptions of the idea of necessity: one synthetic, and the other analytic; one dialectic, the other deterministic. the first makes history appear as an intelligible becoming within which the particularity of contingent accidents is reabsorbed; the dialectical sequence of the moments is possible only if there is within each moment an indetermination of the particular elements taken one by one. if, on the contrary, one grants the strict determinism of each causal series, one neds in a contingent and disordered vision of the ensemble, the conjunction of the series being brought about by chance. therefore, a marxis must recognize that none of the particular decisions involves the revolution in its totality; it is merely a matter of hastening or retarding its coming, of saving himself the use of other and more costly means. that does not mean that he must retreat from violence but that he must not regard it as justified a priori of its ends. if he considers his enterprise in its truth, that is, in its finiteness, he will understand that he has never anything but a finite stake to oppose to the sacrifices which he calls for, and that it is an uncertain stake. of course, this uncertainty should not keep him from pursuing his goals; but it requires that one concern himself in each case with finding a balance between the goal and hte means." pp. 147-148
"the fact is that the man of action becomes a dictator not in respect to his ends but because these ends are necessarily set up through his will. hegel, in his phenomenology, has emphasized this inextricable confusion between objectivity and subjectivity." pp. 153-154
"but the idea of a total dialectic of history does not imply that any factor is ever determining; on the contrary, if one admits that the life of a man may change the course of events, it is that one adheres to the conception which grants a prepondrerant role to cleopatra's nose and cromwell's wart. one is here playing, with utter dishonesty, on two opposite conceptions of the idea of necessity: one synthetic, and the other analytic; one dialectic, the other deterministic. the first makes history appear as an intelligible becoming within which the particularity of contingent accidents is reabsorbed; the dialectical sequence of the moments is possible only if there is within each moment an indetermination of the particular elements taken one by one. if, on the contrary, one grants the strict determinism of each causal series, one neds in a contingent and disordered vision of the ensemble, the conjunction of the series being brought about by chance. therefore, a marxis must recognize that none of the particular decisions involves the revolution in its totality; it is merely a matter of hastening or retarding its coming, of saving himself the use of other and more costly means. that does not mean that he must retreat from violence but that he must not regard it as justified a priori of its ends. if he considers his enterprise in its truth, that is, in its finiteness, he will understand that he has never anything but a finite stake to oppose to the sacrifices which he calls for, and that it is an uncertain stake. of course, this uncertainty should not keep him from pursuing his goals; but it requires that one concern himself in each case with finding a balance between the goal and hte means." pp. 147-148
margot_dv's review against another edition
4.5
“Hoe adembenemend de afmetingen van de wereld om ons heen ook zijn, hoe dicht de duisternis van onze onwetendheid ook is, welke catastrofen ons misschien te wachten staan, en hoe zwak wij als individuen in de reusachtige mensengemeenschap ook zijn: niettemin zijn wij vrij, nu en absoluut. En wij zijn vrij wanneer wij ons met onze existentie daadwerkelijk vereenzelvigen in haar naar de oneindigheid geopende eindigheid.”
sssummer's review against another edition
5.0
I enjoyed this book! It's one of those philosophy books you pick and can immediately tell the author is just a whole different level of intelligence, both intellectually and emotionally. I annotated the first half and there were just so many great lines and sections to make note of that I had to stop or never finish reading it. The main thesis/purpose of the book is Beauvoir's belief that existentialism does implicate an ethical theory, but honestly, I found some of the more notable parts to be the less relevant commentary she writes here and there. She has a way of explaining even things you already know so clearly that you feel like you have a refreshed insight. Even with the translation from French, I would consider this an easy to medium level of readability for a continental philosophy book. There are a lot of references to other philosophy, art, and history that a lot of went over my head.
To significantly reduce the main idea, she argues that the goal of ethics is the optimization of freedom. It's a great theory, and the fact that she builds her metaethics on her metaphysics makes it all so much more interesting and compelling. It's consequentialist heavy, so it's subject to the same issues as other consequentialist theories, but I do think it's one of the better ones. I also think of note is that 'optimizing freedom' is also much more complicated than other consequentialist theories. For example, consider how it compares to the Utilitarian idea goal of 'maximizing pleasure'. Pleasure is a much more tactile and measurable unit than freedom. And 'maximizing' is also more straightforward than 'optimizing'.
I have one other thing about this philosophy that I think is odd: the way emotion is discussed and handled is almost non-existent, and when existent: eerie. The reason I believe this to be is that (existentialist theory as far as I've explored) also largely ignores human emotion or writes it off in an unsatisfying way. My personal take is that this is because the existence of emotions presents somewhat of a hole in the underlying metaphysical theory of existentialism - but don't worry I won't go into that too much here, I promise. So while I do think this book is incredibly intelligent, there's a lot that I actually do not agree with at the end of the day.
Also, not to be a feminist, but her idea for an existentialist ethics is way better than Sarte's (Exsistnatalism is Humanism).
To significantly reduce the main idea, she argues that the goal of ethics is the optimization of freedom. It's a great theory, and the fact that she builds her metaethics on her metaphysics makes it all so much more interesting and compelling. It's consequentialist heavy, so it's subject to the same issues as other consequentialist theories, but I do think it's one of the better ones. I also think of note is that 'optimizing freedom' is also much more complicated than other consequentialist theories. For example, consider how it compares to the Utilitarian idea goal of 'maximizing pleasure'. Pleasure is a much more tactile and measurable unit than freedom. And 'maximizing' is also more straightforward than 'optimizing'.
I have one other thing about this philosophy that I think is odd: the way emotion is discussed and handled is almost non-existent, and when existent: eerie. The reason I believe this to be is that (existentialist theory as far as I've explored) also largely ignores human emotion or writes it off in an unsatisfying way. My personal take is that this is because the existence of emotions presents somewhat of a hole in the underlying metaphysical theory of existentialism - but don't worry I won't go into that too much here, I promise. So while I do think this book is incredibly intelligent, there's a lot that I actually do not agree with at the end of the day.
Also, not to be a feminist, but her idea for an existentialist ethics is way better than Sarte's (Exsistnatalism is Humanism).
paul_viaf's review against another edition
4.0
As the title suggests, de Beauvoir keenly delves into the murkiness of ethics, beyond the Janus of humanity’s psychological face, & into the multidimensional contours of this edifice. Admittedly, this was my first bit of philosophy in quite some time. I am by no means a philosophy major nor do I claim to be. Enigmatic at first, the loop de loops of language began to grow on me & the premise slowly began to bear its form. It begins with the natural state of man which immediately ignites the fuse to the question of the nature of free will. As this is unequivocally from an existentialist perspective, one must not allow preconceived notions to cement its reputation. It is hinged on the realistic of clear observation. The reflection in the mirror scolds the observer with unequivocal truths. This is not a tale of dark peril. On the contrary, it is a tale which sheds light on truth & asks society to realize that if it chooses, in its innate nature, to actuate atrocities or noble feats, the individual is solely accountable. Much of the primary concern seems to deal with identifying the delusion of self, embracing it, becoming onerous to the denial, diagnosing it & taking steps towards changes, if one wills that way. It is quite the poignant lesson in self-identification. It does not suggest how to curtail one’s behavior. Merely to state why it happens & that it does indeed happen. She proposes that all human beings possess weapons of will to combat against the gauntlet of our world, focusing on the individual operating in its particularity while submersed in the apparatus of the collective in the pattern of a Venn diagram affecting & coexisting in a symbiotic & inseparable fashion. She splays out finely sliced situations to reveal the intricate flavors involved to conceive the flavorful life we endure. Yet no one ever said that cornucopia of flavors did not incorporate the bitter or even the acrid. The highly deductive text expresses, with piercing language, all the goodies. Consciousness. Morality. Primal urges. Evil. Motive. Social roles. Justice. Revolution. On blatant frames her articulation strokes these structures with eloquence & clarity. Accompanied by a superlative didactic, her linguistics sharpen ethics & morals with the adze of her wisdom. She works as a crafty metallurgist pounding this amalgam of ores into something meaningful; into a coherent design. A compass to navigate towards a well-informed path. By far one of my favorite segments was Freedom & Liberation. It stirred me so with feelings of fervor yet without the slightest hint of sensationalist language. The blatantly coherent summation of what occurs betwixt these very living entities is enough to make me want to carve revolution into my chest. It revives in me something very fiery. It startles me & sickens me. There is a tinge of despair. Of pessimism. The dichotomy between the oppressed & oppressor was dissected so pellucidly, I could see the hearts of each persona stirring with self-fulfilling desires only made possible by calculated incisions into this delicate tissue, unveiling the deepest buried gears of sociological cognition, revealing the operative motions to the cogs themselves. Uncovered from a convoluted soil are the organs which sustain the life force of motives. They are philosophically photographed as objects which spring forth the action which we experience daily on our chaotic sociopolitical plains. In short, a fantastic read.
I leave this review on a great explanatory quote from the author herself, “I think that, inversely, existentialism does not offer to the reader the consolations of an abstract evasion: existentialism proposes no evasion. On the contrary, its ethics is experienced in the truth of life, & it then appears as he only proposition of salvation which one can address to man.”
I leave this review on a great explanatory quote from the author herself, “I think that, inversely, existentialism does not offer to the reader the consolations of an abstract evasion: existentialism proposes no evasion. On the contrary, its ethics is experienced in the truth of life, & it then appears as he only proposition of salvation which one can address to man.”
stephenmeansme's review against another edition
The French do philosophy in their own special way. The existentialists and modernists even more so. Picking this up as a book club read made all these special ways a big fat obstacle. The book is less than 150 pages but only a third of the club managed to finish it. That's not to knock the big takeaways of de Beauvoir's work, but it's hard to recommend the original when other people can put the ideas into plain talk.
Good parts (that I read): the personality types/stages, which seemed plausible yet evocative. The bit about the "aesthetic attitude" and the use of "natural" arguments to legitimize oppression.
Not so good parts: This book was originally a series of articles, published in Sartre's existentialist journal, in response to Sartre and friends. So it's rather hard to penetrate (especially the first section) if you haven't been reading the existentialists and their predecessors. French philosophy thrives on ambiguity and wordplay, and I'm ambivalent about that. I don't find a philosopher compelling who needs a whole team of exegetes. Thankfully I don't think de Beauvoir is that far gone, but there were long passages where I just couldn't pin anything down. (It doesn't help that she repeats the words "facticity," "being, "existence," "disclose," and so on in long permutations, something like "being becomes existence by making itself a lack of being and in so doing disclosing itself to itself, whereas being itself cannot come to existence but falls back into a mere facticity" and I fell asleep.
Two and a half stars rounded down. This isn't bad philosophy, but I don't think it's philosophy for the general public (or even the "general reader"!).
Good parts (that I read): the personality types/stages, which seemed plausible yet evocative. The bit about the "aesthetic attitude" and the use of "natural" arguments to legitimize oppression.
Not so good parts: This book was originally a series of articles, published in Sartre's existentialist journal, in response to Sartre and friends. So it's rather hard to penetrate (especially the first section) if you haven't been reading the existentialists and their predecessors. French philosophy thrives on ambiguity and wordplay, and I'm ambivalent about that. I don't find a philosopher compelling who needs a whole team of exegetes. Thankfully I don't think de Beauvoir is that far gone, but there were long passages where I just couldn't pin anything down. (It doesn't help that she repeats the words "facticity," "being, "existence," "disclose," and so on in long permutations, something like "being becomes existence by making itself a lack of being and in so doing disclosing itself to itself, whereas being itself cannot come to existence but falls back into a mere facticity" and I fell asleep.
Two and a half stars rounded down. This isn't bad philosophy, but I don't think it's philosophy for the general public (or even the "general reader"!).