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friendofmarlowe's review against another edition
i love using my philosophy class to further my reading challenge. this was like. 10 pages in my editions but fuck it. i’m counting it ok??
drkshadow03's review against another edition
3.0
Monad is a substance that is the simplest indivisible thing that makes up reality. Every Monad is unique from each other and are capable of small changes of their characteristics over time; since Monads are the simplest substances in the universe these small internal changes explain the changes we see in reality. The changes of Monads happen internally since external things cannot affect them because as the simplest substance in the universe, they cannot be divided any further into smaller parts. This also means that Monads lack extension; it doesn’t occupy any space and is immaterial since any physical object can be divided into further smaller parts. So how do Monads differ from atoms? Leibniz describes them more like souls or minds. The Monads have perception even if these are simple perceptions of things that lack true consciousness. Also, each monad is slightly different from every other monad in existence. In my opinion, this idea of monads having perception is one of the harder concepts to fully understand and I am not sure I do completely.
Monads are capable of entering into compounds to form more complex objects. Leibniz argues that if there are compounds, then there must exist simpler substances. Compounds can be broken down to smaller parts, but monads or simple substances can only be created or destroyed as a whole (since it cannot be divided further). Monads as simple substances must have different characteristics from each other, even if undetectable, otherwise they wouldn’t be able to be combined with each other to produce compounds that are different from each other since this would mean somehow different compounds could be produced from the same exact substances with the same exact characteristics. There are no two exactly alike monads or things in nature.
Each monad has a relationship with other monads and reveal different aspects of the universe; each monad is like looking at the same town from a slightly different angle or perspective. For this reason every substance expresses every other substance through the relationships they have with each other. Monads are like small parts of a gigantic necklace in which each bead exists on its own independently, but all of them are ultimately connected in a sequence of one touching the other in a unity that makes up the entire necklace. Another way of thinking about it is with a machine; each individual part of the machine does something different and independent from the entire machine, but also interconnects with each part to make the whole thing work.
God is the primary source of all created beings including other primal substances such as monads. Monads cannot interact and follow their own internal perceptions, except that God allows them to do so. He is like a bridge over a gap between each otherwise self-sufficient Monad. At the moment of Creation, God selected the Monads that are capable of working together in a larger unity to make up the best of all possible universes. For example, the mind is an aggregate of independent Monads and the body is an aggregation of independent monads that can interact through the pre-established harmony created by God, even as they also remain independent. Mind and body interact through the pre-established harmony of God in which each are causally independent, but act together at the same time due to God’s Will. This attempts to address Descartes’ mind-body problem. Basically, God created the interaction between Monads, while each individual monad is still independent, and that includes the monads that make up your mind and body.
In addition to metaphysics, Leibniz also deals with some epistemology in this work. Knowledge of necessary and eternal truths is what separates humans from animals, which allows us to engage in reason and science, and develop knowledge of ourselves and God. As we come to knowledge of necessary truth, it causes us to reflect on ourselves, which then leads to reflexion about God, substances, and compounds. Basically to know oneself leads to reflection on the nature of the universe. Reasoning is grounded in two principles: principles of contradiction (we judge something false if it leads to a contradiction) and sufficient reason (we give reasons why something should be true and not otherwise).
Truths of reasoning are necessary truths, while truths of fact are contingent. For necessary truths we break them down into simpler truths and ideas until we reach the simplest and most basic truths in the same way we can break down geometrical principles to smaller parts: definitions and axioms. These simple principles have no proofs; they are the smallest unit of an idea and cannot be broken down any further.
Monads are capable of entering into compounds to form more complex objects. Leibniz argues that if there are compounds, then there must exist simpler substances. Compounds can be broken down to smaller parts, but monads or simple substances can only be created or destroyed as a whole (since it cannot be divided further). Monads as simple substances must have different characteristics from each other, even if undetectable, otherwise they wouldn’t be able to be combined with each other to produce compounds that are different from each other since this would mean somehow different compounds could be produced from the same exact substances with the same exact characteristics. There are no two exactly alike monads or things in nature.
Each monad has a relationship with other monads and reveal different aspects of the universe; each monad is like looking at the same town from a slightly different angle or perspective. For this reason every substance expresses every other substance through the relationships they have with each other. Monads are like small parts of a gigantic necklace in which each bead exists on its own independently, but all of them are ultimately connected in a sequence of one touching the other in a unity that makes up the entire necklace. Another way of thinking about it is with a machine; each individual part of the machine does something different and independent from the entire machine, but also interconnects with each part to make the whole thing work.
God is the primary source of all created beings including other primal substances such as monads. Monads cannot interact and follow their own internal perceptions, except that God allows them to do so. He is like a bridge over a gap between each otherwise self-sufficient Monad. At the moment of Creation, God selected the Monads that are capable of working together in a larger unity to make up the best of all possible universes. For example, the mind is an aggregate of independent Monads and the body is an aggregation of independent monads that can interact through the pre-established harmony created by God, even as they also remain independent. Mind and body interact through the pre-established harmony of God in which each are causally independent, but act together at the same time due to God’s Will. This attempts to address Descartes’ mind-body problem. Basically, God created the interaction between Monads, while each individual monad is still independent, and that includes the monads that make up your mind and body.
In addition to metaphysics, Leibniz also deals with some epistemology in this work. Knowledge of necessary and eternal truths is what separates humans from animals, which allows us to engage in reason and science, and develop knowledge of ourselves and God. As we come to knowledge of necessary truth, it causes us to reflect on ourselves, which then leads to reflexion about God, substances, and compounds. Basically to know oneself leads to reflection on the nature of the universe. Reasoning is grounded in two principles: principles of contradiction (we judge something false if it leads to a contradiction) and sufficient reason (we give reasons why something should be true and not otherwise).
Truths of reasoning are necessary truths, while truths of fact are contingent. For necessary truths we break them down into simpler truths and ideas until we reach the simplest and most basic truths in the same way we can break down geometrical principles to smaller parts: definitions and axioms. These simple principles have no proofs; they are the smallest unit of an idea and cannot be broken down any further.
ellengrace33's review against another edition
2.0
I don’t know what the hell she saying at this part
iwb's review against another edition
4.0
Leibniz's Monadology is notoriously difficult reading. Even students that have a basic understanding of the development of the notions of substance and body, from Aristotle through Descartes and Newton, have trouble grasping Leibniz's views on monads and aggregation; even more so how such concepts relate to, and are attempts to solve problems associated with, Aristotelian hylomorphism, Scholastic substantial forms, Cartesian extension, and mechanistic corpuscularianism, to name just a few key notions.
Rescher's text, however, is a welcome addition for the student of early modern philosophy. Rescher's text is a reference work that consists of the Monadology, collections of passages from Leibniz's other writings (including passages from letters, essays, and various philosophical writings), as well as Rescher's own erudite (though brief and sparse) comments on particular salient passages that are often problematic for students. The compiled material and comments by Rescher accompany the text of the Monadology, giving one a more illuminated reading than if one were reading solely the Monadology.
It is an idespensible (though not exhausitive) guide to understanding the complicated metaphysics and physics of Leibniz. This is not, however, a secondary source (except in a weak sense). Rescher's text is neither a critical nor historical treatment of the philsophical and scientific issues found in the Monadology; rather it is a guidebook, and an excellent one at that.
If you are reading the Monadology, and if you are not a grad student specializing in the rationalists, early modern in general, or other related fields, this book is a must. Even grad students who have had a couple of classes in early modern can still benefit from this book as well; I certainly did.
Rescher's text, however, is a welcome addition for the student of early modern philosophy. Rescher's text is a reference work that consists of the Monadology, collections of passages from Leibniz's other writings (including passages from letters, essays, and various philosophical writings), as well as Rescher's own erudite (though brief and sparse) comments on particular salient passages that are often problematic for students. The compiled material and comments by Rescher accompany the text of the Monadology, giving one a more illuminated reading than if one were reading solely the Monadology.
It is an idespensible (though not exhausitive) guide to understanding the complicated metaphysics and physics of Leibniz. This is not, however, a secondary source (except in a weak sense). Rescher's text is neither a critical nor historical treatment of the philsophical and scientific issues found in the Monadology; rather it is a guidebook, and an excellent one at that.
If you are reading the Monadology, and if you are not a grad student specializing in the rationalists, early modern in general, or other related fields, this book is a must. Even grad students who have had a couple of classes in early modern can still benefit from this book as well; I certainly did.
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