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Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America's Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan by Steve Coll
ciaranb's review against another edition
emotional
informative
inspiring
reflective
medium-paced
4.0
seanm's review against another edition
challenging
dark
emotional
informative
sad
tense
medium-paced
5.0
johndiconsiglio's review against another edition
3.0
An exhaustive—& exhausting—tome on the CIA’s mishandling of Afghanistan & Pakistan post-9/11. It’s the (long) diary of a trainwreck. American policymakers & spy chiefs discard one hapless plan after another. Pakistan’s ISI plays all sides against each other. And Afghanistan plods through never-ending wars. Coll, dean of Columbia Journalism School, plumbs an impressive breadth of sources. He shifts comfortably from the Oval Office to the Tora Bora caves. Excellent early & late. A morass in the middle. 800-pages is a long time to spend in the Panjshir.
chazzerguy's review against another edition
3.0
Good book... Very dense. This is an almost textbook level of detail, so not light reading.
radbear76's review against another edition
4.0
Like its predecessor, Ghost Wars, this book is eye opening. Its a detailed and comprehensive work that exhaustively explores the conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan since September 11, 2001. The revelations about the way in which the war was/is prosecuted make it clear US efforts were badly planned and that there is no such thing as a counterinsurgency campaign with rapid results. The other clear conclusion is that Pakistan is not an ally but a competitor at best and an adversary at worst. The most sobering conclusion is war will continue to rage in Afghanistan and Pakistan's tribal and border regions well into the future.
I would have given it 5 stars but the book is a little discursive at times and I'm unsure whether the excerpts of US soldiers journals and letters in the latter part of the book added to my understanding.
Overall it's definitely worth reading.
I would have given it 5 stars but the book is a little discursive at times and I'm unsure whether the excerpts of US soldiers journals and letters in the latter part of the book added to my understanding.
Overall it's definitely worth reading.
aehsan's review against another edition
4.0
Very well written and really shed a light on the difficult tri-patriate of Afghan-US-Pak relations, though its still 60% US perspective/history, 30% Afgan and only 10% Pakistan despite the title whcih implies a stronger Pakistan focus. I also found the history suprisingly well balanced between all three viewpoints though there are some issues.
However one key point I ahve to point out is how badly reviewed this book is. Not in terms of quality (Most reviewers give it quite high marks) but the conclusions many reviewers draw from this. I am tired of reading about a "duplictious or decieving" Pakistan when if you read the book you simply cannot reasonably draw that conclusion. The Pakistan Army upfront warned the US that its Northern Alliance based anti-Taliban strategy won't work. The US didnt listen. The Pakistan Army warned the US to seal off Tora Bora and commit more troops as the Pak Army and Frontier Corps couldn't do so alone. The US again didn't listen. This pattern repeats itself again and again. The Pakistani Army consistently lays down its conditions for support to the Americans (Kayani 1.0, 2.0 & 3.0) and none of these conditions were to be met by the US administrations (Bush or Obama). Frankly if Pakistan publicly said it was not supporting the Taliban while privately doing so, it never hid this fact from the US. The US publicly always said it was committed to Afghanistan and Iraq wouldn't distract it...whiel doing exactly that. The real issue that seems to drive American reviewers up the wall is that they asked the Pak Army to do their bidding and Pakistan instead followed its own stated self interest instead. Thats not deception thats poor diplomacy on behalf of the US govt.
One key criticism of the book itself though is its still too America centric both in terms of the costs of war and also ignoring teh evolution of how the Pak Army and public have viewed the conflict in Afghanistan even though it is alluded to in the narrative. For example some key distinct turning points in the way teh Pak public and Army have thought about the Af-War and the Taliban one can readily point to are 1) Musharraf & the Army’s popularity at the start of the conflict (2) Pre and post Lal Masjid (3) The rise of the TTP and the war in Pakistan in Waziristan (4) APS – the Pakistani 9/11 and the immense popularity of Raheel Sharif (The Pak COAS) at the time.These blind spots considerably hurt the book especially considering the title.
This history also suffers (As so much of the narrative around this war does) on overly focusing on the American casualties as the only ones that matter. A long chapter in the book for example focuses on the experiences of a young American officer caught in a frustrating conflict. However what about Afghan or Pakistani combat experiences? They have suffered more casualties and seen more intense combat in this conflict. How are these Armies viewing this conflict and working in it? Showing the non-American/NATO perspective would certainly enrich this history more.
I don’t want the above feedback however to sound too negative as this is a fine book that does the best job (yet) I have read of articulating plainly and simply what has/is going wrong from many sides of the conflict. The criticisms above are more because its so well written that I wished for even more. (less)
However one key point I ahve to point out is how badly reviewed this book is. Not in terms of quality (Most reviewers give it quite high marks) but the conclusions many reviewers draw from this. I am tired of reading about a "duplictious or decieving" Pakistan when if you read the book you simply cannot reasonably draw that conclusion. The Pakistan Army upfront warned the US that its Northern Alliance based anti-Taliban strategy won't work. The US didnt listen. The Pakistan Army warned the US to seal off Tora Bora and commit more troops as the Pak Army and Frontier Corps couldn't do so alone. The US again didn't listen. This pattern repeats itself again and again. The Pakistani Army consistently lays down its conditions for support to the Americans (Kayani 1.0, 2.0 & 3.0) and none of these conditions were to be met by the US administrations (Bush or Obama). Frankly if Pakistan publicly said it was not supporting the Taliban while privately doing so, it never hid this fact from the US. The US publicly always said it was committed to Afghanistan and Iraq wouldn't distract it...whiel doing exactly that. The real issue that seems to drive American reviewers up the wall is that they asked the Pak Army to do their bidding and Pakistan instead followed its own stated self interest instead. Thats not deception thats poor diplomacy on behalf of the US govt.
One key criticism of the book itself though is its still too America centric both in terms of the costs of war and also ignoring teh evolution of how the Pak Army and public have viewed the conflict in Afghanistan even though it is alluded to in the narrative. For example some key distinct turning points in the way teh Pak public and Army have thought about the Af-War and the Taliban one can readily point to are 1) Musharraf & the Army’s popularity at the start of the conflict (2) Pre and post Lal Masjid (3) The rise of the TTP and the war in Pakistan in Waziristan (4) APS – the Pakistani 9/11 and the immense popularity of Raheel Sharif (The Pak COAS) at the time.These blind spots considerably hurt the book especially considering the title.
This history also suffers (As so much of the narrative around this war does) on overly focusing on the American casualties as the only ones that matter. A long chapter in the book for example focuses on the experiences of a young American officer caught in a frustrating conflict. However what about Afghan or Pakistani combat experiences? They have suffered more casualties and seen more intense combat in this conflict. How are these Armies viewing this conflict and working in it? Showing the non-American/NATO perspective would certainly enrich this history more.
I don’t want the above feedback however to sound too negative as this is a fine book that does the best job (yet) I have read of articulating plainly and simply what has/is going wrong from many sides of the conflict. The criticisms above are more because its so well written that I wished for even more. (less)
mubeenirfan's review against another edition
5.0
This is a sequel to Ghost Wars but can be read even without reading Ghost Wars. Still, I strongly recommend to anyone who hasn't read Ghost Wars to go back and read it before starting this one. This book will then make a hundred times more sense.
It starts with the death of Ahmed Shah Masood and 9/11 immediately happening post his assassination bringing the US back to Afghanistan. What follows is a detailed account of tri party mess created in this unfortunate country by the US, Pakistan & Afghans themselves. The relationship between these parties has always lacked trust and mutual understanding, the results of which can be seen in how there is still no sign of peace and prosperity in Afghanistan. In addition to this, the book talks about multi parties in the US establishment and how diverse methodologies, policies & thinking has ended up in no clear line on how the war in Afghanistan should be managed.
Overall, this is Steve Coll is at its best.
It starts with the death of Ahmed Shah Masood and 9/11 immediately happening post his assassination bringing the US back to Afghanistan. What follows is a detailed account of tri party mess created in this unfortunate country by the US, Pakistan & Afghans themselves. The relationship between these parties has always lacked trust and mutual understanding, the results of which can be seen in how there is still no sign of peace and prosperity in Afghanistan. In addition to this, the book talks about multi parties in the US establishment and how diverse methodologies, policies & thinking has ended up in no clear line on how the war in Afghanistan should be managed.
Overall, this is Steve Coll is at its best.
binstonbirchill's review against another edition
5.0
Read Ghost Wars and then read Directorate S. It’s the sort of history that helps one gain perspective. Perspective on war, on societies and peoples lives, on decisions that must be made and on what is achievable and what isn’t. So many mistakes were made and while mistakes can be very easy to point out it’s much more difficult to point towards solutions. Is there even a solution? I guess that would depend on what the goal is. What cost you are willing to pay or have others pay. There were fatal errors throughout but it’s the fatal unforced errors that really gall the reader and there were plenty.
susannadkm's review
informative
sad
medium-paced
4.0
This book was recommended by a friend who lived in Afghanistan as a child. It’s a lengthy account of the war from the perspective of the most senior American figures.
Coll doesn’t shy away from recounting the US’s moral failures, from the CIA’s horrific torture of Afghan prisoners to the civilians killed in drone strikes. (By one count, Bush killed children in ONE THIRD of the drone strikes in 2008. That unconscionable percentage was gradually reduced until Obama killed children in 5% of the drone strikes in 2012. How was that acceptable? 5% is better than 30% but it’s still an abomination.)
However, Coll failed to humanize the Afghan victims of the war by and large. Reading this gives you a lot of information about what was happening at command centers and next to nothing about regular people. I assume that’s because it’s much easier, as an author, to obtain the names and stories of American soldiers who died than those of Afghan civilians.
I found chapter 14, concerning the high rate of suicide bombings by young boys, to be really touching. Targeted by extremists for their low IQ or other disadvantages, the boys would be trained as suicide bombers in madrasas but often were so nervous or ignorant, they failed to kill anyone but themselves.
I haven’t read much about Pakistan before, so I learned quite a bit in this book. Neither their treachery, nor the US’s total lack of respect for their national sovereignty were surprising.
I listened to the audiobook.
Coll doesn’t shy away from recounting the US’s moral failures, from the CIA’s horrific torture of Afghan prisoners to the civilians killed in drone strikes. (By one count, Bush killed children in ONE THIRD of the drone strikes in 2008. That unconscionable percentage was gradually reduced until Obama killed children in 5% of the drone strikes in 2012. How was that acceptable? 5% is better than 30% but it’s still an abomination.)
However, Coll failed to humanize the Afghan victims of the war by and large. Reading this gives you a lot of information about what was happening at command centers and next to nothing about regular people. I assume that’s because it’s much easier, as an author, to obtain the names and stories of American soldiers who died than those of Afghan civilians.
I found chapter 14, concerning the high rate of suicide bombings by young boys, to be really touching. Targeted by extremists for their low IQ or other disadvantages, the boys would be trained as suicide bombers in madrasas but often were so nervous or ignorant, they failed to kill anyone but themselves.
I haven’t read much about Pakistan before, so I learned quite a bit in this book. Neither their treachery, nor the US’s total lack of respect for their national sovereignty were surprising.
I listened to the audiobook.