Scan barcode
theverbalthing's review against another edition
3.0
My rating is based more on the fact that I think Leibniz's theory of monadism is fascinating than anything else. It seems so simple - and so crazy - on the surface, yet some of the complexities of it make me wonder a little. I still don't subscribe to it, even after several weeks of discussion (really, professor?) on it in my modern philosophy course, but it provokes some interesting thought experiments.
schumacher's review against another edition
3.0
Leibniz is an uneven reading experience for me. His principle of sufficient reason, effusive piety, and faith in compossibility are unfashionable at the least. His long digressions into subtle epistemological distinctions are completely uninteresting to me. BUT, Leibniz's exposition of the nature of monads is absolutely fascinating. Getting a view of this beautiful, multi-faceted concept was totally worth skipping around all the other stuff I found to be chaff.
iwb's review against another edition
4.0
This is a collection of the important shorter works of Leibniz's philosophical corpus, which are edited and translated by Garber and Ariew. Some of the more important works featured in this collection are the "Monadology," and "Discourse on Metaphysics," and "On Nature Itself". (So some of the works concern Leibniz's theoretical physics and theology, not just philosophy proper [whatever that is:]) Additionally included are some of Leibniz's correspondence letters, which serve to further buttress the arguments of certain essays. There is a short preface to each essay or letter in which the editor's provide relevant contextual information; moreover, the editors provide footnotes of relevent historical and philosophical, and terminological points that bring out various nuances that might otherwise have been missed entirely.
This work is intended to be a reference work--it's not meant to be read from page one to the end; rather, it is ideal for research, classroom instruction, or for on the go reading when you just need a quick Leibniz fix in a portable format. As an introduction to Leibniz' thought, it's hard to go wrong with this edition.
While using this book in a grad seminar, it was brought to my attention that there are some questionable aspects to the translation. Some of the works in this volume are translated from the Latin, others from the French. Either way, some of the word choices lend themselves to serious misinterpretation in the English. Having said that, while my Latin is better than my French, I don't think my understanding of Leibniz's complicated metaphysics was tainted anymore than it would have been had I been reading from the original languages.
Is I mentioned above, some of the inclusions concern theorectical aspects of various scientific problems, some of which are problems bequethed to Leibniz from previous thinkers, such as Descartes. But some of the selections have prefaces that do not fully bring out the way in which Leibniz' arguments are responses to certain historical problems.
For instance, in section 13 of On Nature Itself, Leibniz raises a number of objections to a view of motion that is compatible with Cartesian physics. The editors, however, do not make clear to which arguments Leibniz was responding. Here is one of these objections, as it relates to Descartes’ view of motion, in a more succinct form than as it occurs in section 13.
The Cartesian view of motion consists in geometrical bodies acting on each other within a plenum. Descartes’ definition of motion is as follows:
"The translation of a piece of matter from the neighborhood of bodies immediately touching it, these being regarded as being at rest, to the neighborhood of others. " Principle of Philosophy. Sec. II, P25.
It is only possible, furthermore, according to Descartes, for the movement of bodies to be circular. Principles II, p33.
Leibniz presents the following argument against this Cartesian view.
(P1) The criterion for distinguishing a uniform mass of matter is motion.
(P2) If motion is transference, then a change of state from one place to another must occur.
(P3) It is not the case that a uniform mass of matter can be distinguished by means of a change of state from one place to another.
(P4) If (P3), then it is not the case that the criterion for distinguishing a uniform mass of matter is motion.
(C1) It is not the case that the criterion for distinguishing a uniform mass of matter is motion.
Leibniz presumably intends this argument to be a reductio of Descartes's view since, if Descartes’s view of motion were true, then we would not be able to distinguish between individual objects; but we do distinguish between individual objects. Descartes’ view, therefore, must be false.
Leibniz gives an argument for (P3), which is reformulated as follows.
(P3a) One part of matter is distinguished from another by means of an extrinsic denomination. [Roughly speaking, an extrinsic denomination is a relational property that does not refer back to the subject:]
(P3b) It is not the case that at present there is a distinguishing criterion.
(P3c) If (P3b), then it is not the case that there is an extrinsic denomination.
(P3d) It is not the case that there is an extrinsic denomination.
(P3e) If (P3d), then it is not the case that one part of matter is distinguished from another.
(C2) It is not the case that one part of matter is distinguished from another.
Leibniz also argues against shape, instead of motion, being the criterion for distinguishing one piece of matter from another. According to Leibniz, a uniform mass of matter, which is infinite (i.e., Cartesian extension)has no boundary. Shape, however, entails a boundary. For that reason, the Cartesians cannot construe a uniform mass of matter as having shape; and hence, shape cannot be a means for distinguishing one piece of matter from another.
This work is intended to be a reference work--it's not meant to be read from page one to the end; rather, it is ideal for research, classroom instruction, or for on the go reading when you just need a quick Leibniz fix in a portable format. As an introduction to Leibniz' thought, it's hard to go wrong with this edition.
While using this book in a grad seminar, it was brought to my attention that there are some questionable aspects to the translation. Some of the works in this volume are translated from the Latin, others from the French. Either way, some of the word choices lend themselves to serious misinterpretation in the English. Having said that, while my Latin is better than my French, I don't think my understanding of Leibniz's complicated metaphysics was tainted anymore than it would have been had I been reading from the original languages.
Is I mentioned above, some of the inclusions concern theorectical aspects of various scientific problems, some of which are problems bequethed to Leibniz from previous thinkers, such as Descartes. But some of the selections have prefaces that do not fully bring out the way in which Leibniz' arguments are responses to certain historical problems.
For instance, in section 13 of On Nature Itself, Leibniz raises a number of objections to a view of motion that is compatible with Cartesian physics. The editors, however, do not make clear to which arguments Leibniz was responding. Here is one of these objections, as it relates to Descartes’ view of motion, in a more succinct form than as it occurs in section 13.
The Cartesian view of motion consists in geometrical bodies acting on each other within a plenum. Descartes’ definition of motion is as follows:
"The translation of a piece of matter from the neighborhood of bodies immediately touching it, these being regarded as being at rest, to the neighborhood of others. " Principle of Philosophy. Sec. II, P25.
It is only possible, furthermore, according to Descartes, for the movement of bodies to be circular. Principles II, p33.
Leibniz presents the following argument against this Cartesian view.
(P1) The criterion for distinguishing a uniform mass of matter is motion.
(P2) If motion is transference, then a change of state from one place to another must occur.
(P3) It is not the case that a uniform mass of matter can be distinguished by means of a change of state from one place to another.
(P4) If (P3), then it is not the case that the criterion for distinguishing a uniform mass of matter is motion.
(C1) It is not the case that the criterion for distinguishing a uniform mass of matter is motion.
Leibniz presumably intends this argument to be a reductio of Descartes's view since, if Descartes’s view of motion were true, then we would not be able to distinguish between individual objects; but we do distinguish between individual objects. Descartes’ view, therefore, must be false.
Leibniz gives an argument for (P3), which is reformulated as follows.
(P3a) One part of matter is distinguished from another by means of an extrinsic denomination. [Roughly speaking, an extrinsic denomination is a relational property that does not refer back to the subject:]
(P3b) It is not the case that at present there is a distinguishing criterion.
(P3c) If (P3b), then it is not the case that there is an extrinsic denomination.
(P3d) It is not the case that there is an extrinsic denomination.
(P3e) If (P3d), then it is not the case that one part of matter is distinguished from another.
(C2) It is not the case that one part of matter is distinguished from another.
Leibniz also argues against shape, instead of motion, being the criterion for distinguishing one piece of matter from another. According to Leibniz, a uniform mass of matter, which is infinite (i.e., Cartesian extension)has no boundary. Shape, however, entails a boundary. For that reason, the Cartesians cannot construe a uniform mass of matter as having shape; and hence, shape cannot be a means for distinguishing one piece of matter from another.
More...