Scan barcode
skitch41's review
5.0
One of the best books of history I have read in recent years was [a:Nigel Hamilton|73331|Nigel Hamilton|https://s.gr-assets.com/assets/nophoto/user/m_50x66-82093808bca726cb3249a493fbd3bd0f.png]'s [bc:The Mantle of Command: FDR at War, 1941–1942|18222685|The Mantle of Command FDR at War, 1941–1942|Nigel Hamilton|https://d.gr-assets.com/books/1387301344s/18222685.jpg|25770440][b:The Mantle of Command: FDR at War, 1941–1942|18222685|The Mantle of Command FDR at War, 1941–1942|Nigel Hamilton|https://d.gr-assets.com/books/1387301344s/18222685.jpg|25770440]. It did much to challenge the old narrative that FDR was, mostly, a hands-off commander-in-chief who gave some direction to the military, but left them to do most of the strategizing. In reality, as that book makes plain, FDR overcame a serious challenge to his authority from his military chiefs and urged the invasion of North Africa, which turned out to be an incredible diplomatic and military coup. I was so impressed by that book that I did not feel there needed to be another. Imagine my delighted surprise then to find Mr. Hamilton continuing his story here with another impressive entry.
In this book, having overcome dissent within the ranks of his military chiefs, FDR spends most of 1943 asserting the United States as the preeminent leader of the Western Allies. That means overcoming Great Britain's courageous, but volatile, prime minister, Winston Churchill. Mr. Hamilton deftly shows how this was no small task. Churchill was very afraid to launch a Cross-Channel invasion of mainland Europe and FDR had to constantly keep him, and the entire Allied war effort, from being derailed by one of Churchill's pet schemes in the Mediterranean. Indeed, just as soon as Churchill would leave one conference, having assented to the Operation Overlord, he would start to renege. It must have been incredibly frustrating and nothing less than success in the war, as well as the Post-War World Order FDR was envisioning, hung on the success of their partnership.
Indeed, FDR's ideas for a new Post-War World Order is a constant leit motif throughout this book. There has been some debate as to whether or not FDR envisioned how difficult dealing with the Soviets would be or whether or not he was truly giving up Eastern Europe to Soviet domination after the war. Backed by incredible research into, among other documents, then-Canadian Prime Minster Mackenzie King's extensive diaries during these days, Mr. Hamilton shows that not only was FDR envisioning a Post-War World Order at the same time American forces were landing in North Africa, but that FDR was well aware that Stalin was just as bad as Hitler, but the U.S. could only do so much for Eastern Europe and the Balkans at that time. Indeed, Mr. Hamilton seems to suggest that FDR was already seeing the contours of the conflict that would become the Cold War long before anyone else could, which is why he kept Churchill and Great Britain so close to himself and America as a sign of Western resolve not just to Nazi Germany and Japan then, but to the Soviets later.
The one thing I have against this book is that Mr. Hamilton, for the sake of creative license, seems to act as if he knows exactly what is going on FDR's head. Often times he'll write about how FDR "could only shake his head" at Churchill or the military chiefs saying or suggesting something supremely stupid. It smacks of the 20/20 hindsight that historians often enjoy when looking at past events. However, I will say that Mr. Hamilton, backed by the personal diaries of key figures surrounding FDR and Churchill during these days, must be very close to truth. In summation, this is another surprisingly enlightening look at FDR as Commander-in-Chief not just of American forces, but of Allied forces as well.
In this book, having overcome dissent within the ranks of his military chiefs, FDR spends most of 1943 asserting the United States as the preeminent leader of the Western Allies. That means overcoming Great Britain's courageous, but volatile, prime minister, Winston Churchill. Mr. Hamilton deftly shows how this was no small task. Churchill was very afraid to launch a Cross-Channel invasion of mainland Europe and FDR had to constantly keep him, and the entire Allied war effort, from being derailed by one of Churchill's pet schemes in the Mediterranean. Indeed, just as soon as Churchill would leave one conference, having assented to the Operation Overlord, he would start to renege. It must have been incredibly frustrating and nothing less than success in the war, as well as the Post-War World Order FDR was envisioning, hung on the success of their partnership.
Indeed, FDR's ideas for a new Post-War World Order is a constant leit motif throughout this book. There has been some debate as to whether or not FDR envisioned how difficult dealing with the Soviets would be or whether or not he was truly giving up Eastern Europe to Soviet domination after the war. Backed by incredible research into, among other documents, then-Canadian Prime Minster Mackenzie King's extensive diaries during these days, Mr. Hamilton shows that not only was FDR envisioning a Post-War World Order at the same time American forces were landing in North Africa, but that FDR was well aware that Stalin was just as bad as Hitler, but the U.S. could only do so much for Eastern Europe and the Balkans at that time. Indeed, Mr. Hamilton seems to suggest that FDR was already seeing the contours of the conflict that would become the Cold War long before anyone else could, which is why he kept Churchill and Great Britain so close to himself and America as a sign of Western resolve not just to Nazi Germany and Japan then, but to the Soviets later.
The one thing I have against this book is that Mr. Hamilton, for the sake of creative license, seems to act as if he knows exactly what is going on FDR's head. Often times he'll write about how FDR "could only shake his head" at Churchill or the military chiefs saying or suggesting something supremely stupid. It smacks of the 20/20 hindsight that historians often enjoy when looking at past events. However, I will say that Mr. Hamilton, backed by the personal diaries of key figures surrounding FDR and Churchill during these days, must be very close to truth. In summation, this is another surprisingly enlightening look at FDR as Commander-in-Chief not just of American forces, but of Allied forces as well.
rbkegley's review
5.0
This thoroughly-researched and well-written account covers a single year of World War II, 1943. It was a year that began with the Allies pressing their first amphibious landing in North Africa, resulting in the clearing of Africa of German and Italian resistance. Building on the battle experience, at the infantry and command levels, gained in that campaign, US and British forces successfully invaded Sicily. A side-effect of this invasion was drawing German attention and forces from fighting the Soviets at Kursk, which would prove to be the last major offensive chance that Germany would have in their Eastern Front. Through it all, Roosevelt continued to focus on the objective of defeating Germany completely through an invasion across the English Channel, once again insisting in a battle of wills against the desire of Churchill, and some US commanders, to drive up through Italy to Germany. Though dealing with only a single year of the war, it was a pivotal time, which saw the US military recognize and begin to wield its enormous strength, not only of materiel, but of heroic leadership and ground-level determination.
More...