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courthompson's review against another edition
5.0
This book is incredibly dense, but so well researched and thoughtfully organized. Context is brought to so many of the decisions made at the time and so many primary resources were used. This is THE book to read if you're interested in understanding the Cuban Missile Crisis.
ncrabb's review against another edition
4.0
You just never know how a kid is going to turn out. This book opens with a super-brief look at Castro’s childhood and the fierce denunciation by nun who taught him that he would ever be a communist. The authors fill the book with bits of information about which I had no knowledge, and that’s what made it a fascinating read for me. I had no idea, for example, that Castro’s rebels kidnapped American and Canadian armed servicemen and civilians in the summer of 1958. (Hey, I was only six months old; I get a pass for not knowing about this.) The rebels demanded that Washington stop selling arms to Cuban Dictator Batista and pledge not to use the naval base at Guantanamo to stage a military crackdown on Castro and associates. Eisenhower prudently suspended the aircraft deliveries, and the communists prudently released the hostages. But the relationship between Washington and Castro would be sour at best from then forward.
When he blitzed America with his six-city summer tour in 1959, Cubans had the second highest living standard of any Latin-American nation primarily due to U.S. investments in the region, according to the authors. While attempting to charm the American people, he denied vociferously that he leaned toward communism. While visiting Harvard as part of that tour, Castor pointed out that the school rejected his application. School officials eagerly promised him a slot in the upcoming school year if he wanted it. What a different world had he taken them up on it.
The book credits Raul Castro as the point man who brought together Cuban and Kremlin officials, all this while Fidel repeatedly denied that communism would be part of his new government. The initial rivalry between the Castro brothers is fascinating. Raul got support from Che Guevara. Fidel gradually changed when he saw Soviet support coming in the form of weapons.
You’ll walk with these authors the tortuous path to the Bay of Pigs debacle, and while modern images from Afghanistan smack of another debacle, you’ll at least be able to recall from this book that it isn’t the first time. Smarting from his failures at Bay of Pigs, Kennedy seems obsessed with Cuba, according to the authors. He even plans another invasion, this time with plenty of air power, possibly after the congressional elections.
That invasion never happens, because Khrushchev decides if Kennedy can plant missiles in Turkey, Khrushhev can plant missiles in Cuba. Stalin had no desire to spread communism to the Caribbean, believing he had enough to do in eastern Europe. But that didn’t stop Khrushchev.
You follow detailed cabinet-level conversations wherein Kennedy and friends debate the merits of a full-on air strike designed to disable the missiles before they can be operational to a blockade that would prevent the Russians from bringing additional nuclear firepower into the region. We know how the story ends—Kennedy pulls already aging Jupiter missiles out of Turkey, and Khrushchev reluctantly brings home his arsenal.
The authors then explore the aftermath of the missile crisis. In tiresome fashion, they speculate on whether the Cuban Missile Crisis indirectly caused Kennedy’s death or whether Oswald indeed acted alone as the Warren Commission claimed. They link Khrushchev’s humiliating demise in 1964 in part to the Cuban standoff.
I wish I had read this when it was first available. I might have had less difficulty processing a long parade of names, mostly foreign. I find these days if you force me to deal with seemingly endless lists of names, I struggle trying to keep everyone together and remember what their role is. That’s a reader failure of mine.
When he blitzed America with his six-city summer tour in 1959, Cubans had the second highest living standard of any Latin-American nation primarily due to U.S. investments in the region, according to the authors. While attempting to charm the American people, he denied vociferously that he leaned toward communism. While visiting Harvard as part of that tour, Castor pointed out that the school rejected his application. School officials eagerly promised him a slot in the upcoming school year if he wanted it. What a different world had he taken them up on it.
The book credits Raul Castro as the point man who brought together Cuban and Kremlin officials, all this while Fidel repeatedly denied that communism would be part of his new government. The initial rivalry between the Castro brothers is fascinating. Raul got support from Che Guevara. Fidel gradually changed when he saw Soviet support coming in the form of weapons.
You’ll walk with these authors the tortuous path to the Bay of Pigs debacle, and while modern images from Afghanistan smack of another debacle, you’ll at least be able to recall from this book that it isn’t the first time. Smarting from his failures at Bay of Pigs, Kennedy seems obsessed with Cuba, according to the authors. He even plans another invasion, this time with plenty of air power, possibly after the congressional elections.
That invasion never happens, because Khrushchev decides if Kennedy can plant missiles in Turkey, Khrushhev can plant missiles in Cuba. Stalin had no desire to spread communism to the Caribbean, believing he had enough to do in eastern Europe. But that didn’t stop Khrushchev.
You follow detailed cabinet-level conversations wherein Kennedy and friends debate the merits of a full-on air strike designed to disable the missiles before they can be operational to a blockade that would prevent the Russians from bringing additional nuclear firepower into the region. We know how the story ends—Kennedy pulls already aging Jupiter missiles out of Turkey, and Khrushchev reluctantly brings home his arsenal.
The authors then explore the aftermath of the missile crisis. In tiresome fashion, they speculate on whether the Cuban Missile Crisis indirectly caused Kennedy’s death or whether Oswald indeed acted alone as the Warren Commission claimed. They link Khrushchev’s humiliating demise in 1964 in part to the Cuban standoff.
I wish I had read this when it was first available. I might have had less difficulty processing a long parade of names, mostly foreign. I find these days if you force me to deal with seemingly endless lists of names, I struggle trying to keep everyone together and remember what their role is. That’s a reader failure of mine.
d0rkyc0rky's review
5.0
This book is incredibly dense, but so well researched and thoughtfully organized. Context is brought to so many of the decisions made at the time and so many primary resources were used. This is THE book to read if you're interested in understanding the Cuban Missile Crisis.
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