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blueyorkie's review against another edition
3.0
Imagination or the production of images poses a problem in philosophy: what is an image, what is its nature, how does it differ from reality - and if reality is only one image, how to distinguish between imagination and reality, between false and true - and if the image is of a different nature from reality, what is it, how is it produced, how is it stored, how is it remembered, etc.
Philosophers have all broken their teeth on this thorny problem. For Descartes, reality and image do not make a difference; it is the understanding that makes the selection. This point of view is not very satisfactory because experience makes us live every day that we immediately make the difference between a voice "in our head" and the neighbour next door who speaks, without "thinking" or "reason" to achieve this result. For empiricists, it's all about sensations since consciousness does not exist - the image only reproduces the real sensations, but less strongly. Not very convincing either: when I think of an injury, I remember being in pain, but I don't remember the pain. For psychologists, it is not better; the world is reconstituted in each one of us so that the objectivity of the matter is denied. For everyone, or almost, the image is an image of reality - but then why is it always more blurry, less clear, less certain than real perception?
Of course, Husserl and the Würzburg Philosophers offers an interesting option by eliminating the question of the image by differentiating its fixation from its production, a living process which is renewed each time, either through the perception or through precertification. But where is the image stored? by what operation are we going to look for it? and once again, how to differentiate the process of precertification (recalled memory) and real perception: where is the information? ... It remains for JPS to write a book on the subject. It will be called "The Imaginary". And perhaps since then, neurology has brought some interesting experiments to submit to philosophy.
Philosophers have all broken their teeth on this thorny problem. For Descartes, reality and image do not make a difference; it is the understanding that makes the selection. This point of view is not very satisfactory because experience makes us live every day that we immediately make the difference between a voice "in our head" and the neighbour next door who speaks, without "thinking" or "reason" to achieve this result. For empiricists, it's all about sensations since consciousness does not exist - the image only reproduces the real sensations, but less strongly. Not very convincing either: when I think of an injury, I remember being in pain, but I don't remember the pain. For psychologists, it is not better; the world is reconstituted in each one of us so that the objectivity of the matter is denied. For everyone, or almost, the image is an image of reality - but then why is it always more blurry, less clear, less certain than real perception?
Of course, Husserl and the Würzburg Philosophers offers an interesting option by eliminating the question of the image by differentiating its fixation from its production, a living process which is renewed each time, either through the perception or through precertification. But where is the image stored? by what operation are we going to look for it? and once again, how to differentiate the process of precertification (recalled memory) and real perception: where is the information? ... It remains for JPS to write a book on the subject. It will be called "The Imaginary". And perhaps since then, neurology has brought some interesting experiments to submit to philosophy.
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